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Hypothesis

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Populism, Identities and Social Movements in Lebanon: From a Sectarian Identity to a Popular One?

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Abstract: Populism is a major feature of our times. From western democracies to Asia to the Arab world, the rise of populist movements is characterized by the access to power of two types of populism. The first, known as identity populism and driven by nationalism, led to the emergence of radical right political parties, leaders and nationalists' movements. Another type of populism is the protest populism, a leftwing populism rallying the people against the establishment. Identified by the outburst of popular protest movements mobilizing millions of people in the streets, protest populism caused the appearance of new leftwing populist parties and leaders with populist and anti-elitist rhetoric forging a popular identity crystallized around the people against the elite.

This article discusses the potential of protest populism to counter identity populism and, more particularly, whether Lebanese protests are creating a popular collective identity that could undermine the prevailing sectarian identity driven by a deeply rooted sectarian populism. At the theoretical intersection of populism, social movements and collective identities, the article explores the benefits and limitations of protest populism in Lebanon to create a popular identity as an alternative to the prevailing sectarianism.

Key words: Populism, collective identity, popular identity, sectarianism, social movements

Abstrait: Le populisme est une caractéristique majeure de notre époque. Des démocraties occidentales à l'Asie en passant par le monde arabe, la montée des mouvements populistes se caractérise par l'accès au pouvoir de deux types de populisme. Le premier, connu sous le nom de populisme identitaire et poussé par le nationalisme, a conduit à l'émergence de partis politiques de droite radicale, de leaders et de mouvements nationalistes. Un autre type de populisme est le populisme protestataire, un populisme de gauche qui rassemble le peuple contre l'establishment. Identifié par la montée en puissance des mouvements de protestation populaire mobilisant des millions de personnes dans les rues, le populisme protestataire a provoqué l'apparition de nouveaux partis et dirigeants populistes de gauche avec une rhétorique populiste et anti-élitiste forgeant une identité populaire cristallisée autour du peuple contre l'élite.

Cet article examine le potentiel du populisme de protestation pour contrer le populisme identitaire et, plus particulièrement, si les protestations libanaises créent une identité collective populaire qui pourrait saper l'identité sectaire dominante, animée par un populisme sectaire profondément enraciné. À l'intersection théorique du populisme, des mouvements sociaux et des identités collectives, l'article explore les avantages et les limites du populisme de protestation au Liban pour créer une identité populaire comme alternative au sectarisme dominant.

Mots clés: Populisme, identité collective, identité populaire, sectarisme, mouvements sociaux

1. The Era of Populism

We live in what is considered the “populist zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004) or the era of populism. In western liberal democracies, populist movements are characterized by the rise of radical right political parties, leaders and nationalist movements that are hostile to immigration, international treaties, international institutions and globalization (Crewe and Sanders 2019). Taguieff suggests that there are two types of populism: the identity populism and the protest populism. Identity populism is more of a rightwing base and relies on the ethnos rather the demos (Taguieff 2007); it is rooted in identity rather than economic inequality and fueled by ethnicity, race and religion (Fukuyama 2018). Identity populism aims to rally inter-class front to protect identities. Contemporary populist movements in the West are mainly built around national identity and explain the rise of populist leaders, like Marine Le Pen, Donald Trump, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orban, or populist parties, such as Vox in Spain, the Freedom Party in Austria or the Alternative for Germany.

Another contemporary phenomena is the rise of “the movements of the squares'' (Gerbaudo 2017) or popular protest movements mobilizing millions of people. These movements emerged globally starting with the Arab Spring, followed by the Spanish and Greek protests and most recently in Chile, Hong Kong, France (Yellow Vest) and the United States (Black Lives Matter). Formed by unformal and deinstitutionalized groups and characterized by the occupation of city squares and setting up of long term protest camps, these social movements actively use the public space to announce their grievances and put collective pressure on authorities to take on changes. They fall under what Taguieff (2007) calls protest populism, a leftwing phenomenon that led to the rise of left wing populism parties, like Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece, or populist leaders, like Bernie Sanders in the United States. It even managed in some countries to change the existing political system (Gerbaudo 2017). The traditional and established parties lost their hegemony in favor of "street politics," (Bayat 2010) driven by new populist actors with other political alternatives and with a call for the people against the ruling elites (political, economic or cultural elites).

Beyond being a place to communicate grievances, streets and squares became a place where protestors experienced solidarity, friendships and a sense of unity (Ishkanian, Glasius and Ali 2013). Through their collective demands, shared feelings and experiences, a collective identity is forged and transformed into a popular identity where the "us" is crystalized around "the people" while "them" is the power holders. This common ground is able to bring together dispersed identities under a new political one: the popular identity.

In Arab countries, popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes started in Tunisia in 2010 and spread across the region (Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya), demanding democracy, social freedom and better participation in political life. As for Lebanon, it was not until 2015 that the country really jumped on the Arab Spring bandwagon when protesters took to the streets after the government's failure to collect trash piling up in the streets for weeks, mainly because of sectarian power sharing and corruption. The so-called "garbage crisis" marked the beginning of popular non-sectarian mobilizations (Salloukh and Verheij 2017). On October 17, 2019, Lebanon witnessed a new wave of decentralized and grassroots social protests that engaged citizens from diverse socio-economic, geographical and religious backgrounds. "Al-Thawra" (revolution in Arabic), as protestors call it, successfully mobilized Lebanese citizens regardless of their historical belonging and loyalty to political and sectarian parties. Protests were sparked by a proposed tax on messaging applications. However, the roots of the issue go much deeper and have to do with a severe economic crisis, lack of dollars, a deficient banking system, government inability to deliver any efficient service (electricity, water, social services…) and, above all, institutionalized corruption and sectarianism (Chehayeb and Sewell 2019).

The paper discusses the potential of protest populism to counter identity populism. In other words, can these new protest-populism-based social movements create a collective identity that contests exiting political identities? The research will focus on Lebanon's protests and explore whether divided Lebanese are creating a new popular identity that could undermine the prevailing and supposedly fixed sectarian identity fueled by sectarian populism. Indeed, Lebanon's history of self-governing communities laid the foundation for the development of sectarianism, i.e. the structuring of politics around sectarian identity (Cammet 2014) where the religion is the primary marker of political identity (Makdisi 2000).

The research relies on ethnographic field study to collect activists' interviews, documentary data in books, articles, media content to analyze two main popular protests in Lebanon (2015 and 2019).[1] As the protests continued to unfold in 2019 during the research, we relied also on observation and interaction with the protesters to grasp the real-life environment; the immersion approach helping us to explore the complex dynamic of collective identities. At the theoretical intersection of populism, social movements and collective identities, the article explores the benefits and limitations of this protest populism to create a popular identity as an alternative to the prevailing sectarian identity.

2. Lebanon's Controversial Collective Identity

A collective identity is considered as a unified social group that comes out from collective attributes, like class, nation, ethnic background, race, gender and profession (McGarry and Jasper 2015). It is regarded as an act of collective imagination, stirring a group of people to mobilize through arousal of feelings of oneness with others or by separating the group from other categories of people (McGarry and Jasper 2015). This process largely stems from the universal mental process of social categorization that divides people into "us" and "them": The ingroup is a source of pride and self-esteem while the out-group is labeled with negative attributes (Tajfel 1974). It is perceived to be a necessary fiction as it is crucial not only for political mobilization but also for transforming societies into a "nation". Smith (1988) suggests that most modern nations are not awakening nations to self-consciousness resulting from a natural sense of self-collectiveness. They are mainly invented nations relying on a myth of shared history and common descent. They are "imagined communities" and should be analyzed in the way they imagine themselves and not who they really are (Anderson 2006).

In the case of Lebanon, the national collective identity emerged alongside other collective identities and deep-rooted sectarianism, which is a particular type of collective identity. Sectarianism is considered as the organization of political, economic, and social life in a way that it "redirects individual loyalties away from state institutions and symbols toward sectarian communities" (Salloukh, Barakat, et al. 2015, 3). Since the end of the 5th century, persecuted minorities have found shelter in Lebanon's uneven mountainous landscape, which permitted them to develop their singularity, allowing 18 religious communities[2] to live together in relative harmony and peace. Any interference in another community's social or political life broke up the equilibrium and often led to armed conflicts (Azar 1999). The communities living on what will be later Lebanon developed a strong self-consciousness as a sectarian identity.

Scholars trace the construction of modern sectarianism in Lebanon back to the 19th century when Maronites and Druze, with the support of the Ottoman Empire and European partners, strived to end violence and determine the boundaries and relationship between both communities (Makdisi, 2000; Weiss, 2010). It started in 1843 when the Ottomans established a dual "qa'immaqamiyya", a system of proportional representation for each sectarian community. In 1861, as fighting kept on erupting frequently, Ottomans promulgated the "Reglement Organique" reunifying Lebanon under the "Mutasarrifiyya": a separate governing institution for Mount Lebanon under the sway of a "Mutasarrif", a governor appointed by the Ottomans, and an administrative council based on proportional representation.[3] It engendered and institutionalized sectarianism in Lebanon by installing power sharing that is based on quotas proportional to political and demographic power between different sectarian communities (Salloukh *et al*, 2015).

Lebanon as a modern state was created after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and following the powerful and pressing instigation of the Maronite

Church and political leaders. Lebanon and Syria's French mandate authorities created Greater Lebanon in 1920 by annexing the Beqaa Valley and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains to Mount Lebanon, Beirut and coastal towns. The creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 took place amidst a problematic national identity, other collective identities and increased intercommunal tensions: Shiites considered themselves more Syrian than Lebanese, Greek Orthodox and Catholics were in favor of Syrian unity and Sunnis were advocating for an Arab State (Salibi 1988).

By doing so, Greater Lebanon demographics were modified, significantly increasing the number of Druze and Muslims (both Shiites and Sunnis), while Christians, mainly Maronites, represented around 50% of the population. In order to guarantee power sharing for each community, the Lebanese Constitution (1926) granted each community specific personal status law (Article 9), freedom of education and the right for religious communities to have their own schools (Article 10). It also stipulated that state jobs would be divided fairly and proportionally between communities, thus allowing the country to leap to unconditional and complete sectarianism (Rabbath 1983).

To secure a viable model, the power sharing recipe was adopted again in 1943 whilst the creation of the Republic of Lebanon along with the "National Act", an unwritten agreement between the Christian President of the Republic and the Sunni Prime Minister stipulating that the President will be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni and the speaker of the Parliament Shiite. Other executive, legislative and judicial powers will also be distributed according to sectarian power sharing principle. The system is also known as Consociationalism.

Consociationalism was first employed in the Netherlands in 1917 and has been used since to reach a peaceful solution in politically destabilized countries and ethnic-racial tensions (Lijphart 1968). If this power sharing strategy was successful in countries like Northern Ireland or Cyprus, in other societies, such as Lebanon, consociationalism reinforced divisions: it institutionalized the existence of ethnic differences rather than piecing back together a shared collective identity (Lijphart 1977). The inter-sectarian power sharing formula that was supposed to stabilize the country turned out to be non-viable in the long run. The collective identity narratives around the "pluralistic society", "the bridge between East and West" and "Switzerland of the East" worked for two decades,[4] but could not successfully stand the external and internal political tensions and a deeply rooted and polarized sectarian identity.

Indeed, the Lebanese civil war between 1975 and 1990 heightened sectarian divisions, with every community establishing its own militia, administrative bodies and media channels (Salloukh *et al.* 2015) and living on its own homogeneous ethnic territory. Sectarian political parties and leaders sought the support of an external coalition in order to strengthen their local power. In 1989, a national reconciliation agreement, known as Ta'if Agreement, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia and approved by Lebanese parliament. The agreement put an end to the civil war and "recycled the sectarian political system in a manner reflecting new demographic and political realities but did not dismantle it" (Salloukh *et al.* 2015*,* 21). It reflected also regional balance of power: executive power shifted from the Christian Maronite president to the Council of Ministries, composed of the representative ministries of the communities and political parties, giving more power to Sunni and Shiite communities.

Ethnic conflict is an example of how identities can turn deadly and are strategically used to hold power (Nagle 2015). Political elites exacerbate tensions by exploiting prejudices and hatred between groups (Posen 1993). Lebanon was no exception and political leaders used all means to hold power. Populism was one of them.

3. Sectarian Populism

Although populism has become one of the major "buzz words" of this century, there is a large confusion about the concept and a lack of a theory of populism and thus consistent measures to classify what and who is populist (Müller 2016). Even though some scholars trace back the birthplace of populism in ancient Rome (Doan 2019), it is widely considered as a modern phenomenon that appeared in the late 19th century in the United States and Russia as populist agrarian and rural movements (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). Throughout the years, the term has been used for various and often contradictory phenomena: from democratic to autocratic countries, from left-wing to right-wing parties and from liberal to totalitarian regimes, they are all upbraided as populists, making it a political controversial concept. Taggart considers populism as a "slippery concept" with "chameleon quality," making it quite difficult, rather impossible, to have a universal and comprehensive definition (Taggart 2000).

Mudde, a reference in the field of populism studies, considers populism "as a thin-centered ideology," i.e. it can engage concepts from other ideologies, allowing the constitution of diversified and contradictory "populist" movements with three common concepts: the people, the elite and the general will. Society is ultimately separated into two antagonistic camps, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," with politics being an expression of the general will (Mudde 2004). Populism is also defined as a rhetorical style of communication arguing that the only legitimacy comes from the people or "Us", while "Them" are the deeply corrupted power holders (Jagers & Walgrave 2007; Aslanidis 2015; Norris & Inglehart 2019).

This paper will not argue over the definition of populism. Populism has multiple forms depending on the cultural, political and geographical environment (Manshur 2019). Since there is a general agreement that all types of populism incorporate the concept of the "people" against "the elite", while the definition of the people depends on populist practices, this paper will look at populism as a political tool to mobilize a social group with collective attributes (real or fiction) against the "Other". It will be used as a lens to help us understand if the rise of a popular identity in Lebanon can undermine the prevailing sectarian collective identity nurtured by sectarian populism.

According to Salamey and Tabar (2012), contemporary populist movements in Lebanon can be traced back to the 1950s with the *Chamounism* party led by Camille Chamoun[5] who "skillfully capitalized" on the Nasserism[6] "thread" to increase his popularity and turn into "the defender of Christian interests" (El-Khazen 2000, 52). It was followed in the 1960s by the *Harakat al-Mahroumin* (The Deprived Movement). Founded by Imam Moussa Sadr, the movement was an attempt to encounter Maronite hegemony over the political and economic life of the country and to increase the share of the Shiite community, which remained the most economically disadvantaged and politically underrepresented. After the mysterious disappearance of the Imam, Amal Movement took leadership of the

Shiite community until the rise of the populist Hezbollah Party, which still has the lead on the community since the end of the Lebanese war in 1990, with a perfectly orchestrated populist and propagandist discourse by Hassan Nasrallah, a strong and charismatic leader.

During the civil war, most Christian parties were reunited by Bashir Gemayel under the right-wing Lebanese Forces militia. The charismatic young man took the lead of the Christian community and was considered as a hero by a large number of the community, which was galvanized by his anti-Palestinian and anti-Syrian populist discourses. He was assassinated in 1982 at the age of 34, less than one month after his election as president of the republic. Gemayel is still considered as one of the most charismatic and populist leaders of the Christian community (El-Khazen 2000). By the end of the civil war, Michel Aoun[7] took the lead as Christian populist leader. Aoun's discourse, revolving around liberating the country from Syrian occupation and putting an end to state corruption, seduced the Christian population seeking stability and tired of the Christian militia (Laurent 1991). Although he started with a relative secular political discourse, his party (Free Patriotic Movement) shifted to a "sectarian political discourse, practices and strategy to compete against its sectarian counterparts" (Helou 2020, 3). Recent years featured the rise of Samir Geagea[8] as a populist leader among the Christian community, with his campaigns targeting mainly Hezbollah's weapons, Saad Hariri's accommodation of their interests and President Aoun's alliance with the party (Mansour and Khatib 2018). Sunni populism experienced a pan-Arab orientation with no major sectarian populist leadership (El-Khazen 2000) until the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and the arrival to power of his son Saad Al-Din Hariri (Salamey and Tabar 2012). As for the Druze community, they always had unconditional support to the Jumblatt family, be it Kamal or his son Walid (El-Khazen 1988).

Populist movements in Lebanon have a "unique character". They always came out around sectarian requests and would on no account be able to turn into a unifying national populist movement (Salamey and Tabar 2012, 500). Sectarian populist leaders always bring out sectarian identities and use sectarian populism to obstruct the emergence of cross-confessional movements or a popular identity. If this strategy has been successful for over a century, are the actual nonsectarian social movements undermining the deeply rooted sectarian identity and re-categorizing the country with a more inclusive popular identity?

4. From the “Garbage Crisis” to “Al-Thawra”[9]

In summer 2015, a surge of outrage hit Lebanon when garbage started piling up in the streets of Beirut and its suburbs after the closure of one of the main landfills. The government failed to renew the contract of the company in charge of waste collection due to sectarian and economic power sharing. What started with a small group of civil society activists requesting a solution for the garbage crisis turned into larger protests rejecting clientelism and demanding democracy and better livelihood. This grassroots social movement was called “Harak” (movement in Arabic) and marked the emergence of two main movements: You Stink and We Want Accountability. You Stink started as online activism with the hashtag #youstink against the ruling elite unable to solve the trash crisis then turned into a Facebook page before changing into a physical mobilization in the streets and squares. It is considered as a spontaneous movement and included mainly young activist from civil society organizations (Civil Society Knowledge Center 2019). While We Want Accountability included independents and members from left wing parties[10] (AbiYaghi, Catusse and Younes 2017) and relied more on traditional forms of mobilizations among networks and less on social medias (Civil Society Knowledge Center 2019). Although they succeeded in mobilizing large amount of cross-sectarian protestors, they failed to have a unified discourse and to transform the street’s demands into a political program. According to Nammour,[11] 2015 protests did not convince the people or “the average citizen”. It was “labeled” as a civil society movement of educated middle class activists with middle class claims that were not able to communicate with the popular base or to “break the social barrier”. The “Us” (civil society and secular educated middle class activists) and “Them” (traditional parties) did not appeal to the larger segment of the population. In terms of garbage and environmental crisis, the outcome was the return to the pre-protest period with a “ticking time bomb” ready to explode at any time (Civil Society Knowledge Center 2019). Still, 2015 protests paved the way for

"Beirut Madinati", a collective political movement created in September 2015 by academics and activists which challenged mainstream sectarian lists during Beirut's municipal elections.

On October 17, 2019, protesters took to the streets spontaneously across Lebanon in reaction to a proposed tax on WhatsApp and messaging applications. The tax did spark the uprisings, but the demands were rooted in political and economic grievances: sectarianism, nepotism, government inability to deal with the electricity and water shortage, garbage collection, failure of social services institutions and above all a striking economic crisis and institutionalized corruption (Chehayeb and Sewell 2019). October 17, 2019 is considered by far the most important grassroots social mobilization since the end of the civil war that was able to mobilize cross-sectarian and cross-socioeconomic protestors (Bou Khater and Majed 2020). Although Lebanon does not have a long history in collective cross sectarian action, the multiple and successive protests initiated since 2011 were building up to the outburst of October uprisings as they helped to break the boundaries of fear from the sectarian elites, especially for the Shiite community (Civil Society Knowledge Center 2020).

Another characteristic of this uprising is its grassroots nature without a clear centralized leadership. As well as worldwide street mobilizations (Ishkanian, Glasius and Ali 2013), Lebanese protesters created grassroots horizontal practices in order to avoid the hierarchal structure of power found in a direct democracy parliament model, with shared decision making and where everything is collectively debated and voted. According to Fakhry,[12] "a leader does not exist without the people and people are clear: they don't want a leader with a personal agenda; they want institutions." Nammour considers that the rejection of all kind of leadership is the "essence and the DNA of October protests. Protesters were living a libertarian utopia without any power; everything was permitted." These protests are the union of neo-anarchism and democratic populism, described by Gerbaudo (2017) as "citizenism" or the populism of the citizen. It is horizontal populism that does not need a leader to identify with or unite it.

Unlike 2015 where protesters stayed confined and limited to symbolic spaces like Downtown Beirut, they ventured also in popular neighborhoods. According to Nammour, all socioeconomic classes were present during the protests, from the popular class to the middle class and upper class. “This alliance surprised everybody, especially the political parties who did not know how to react at the beginning.” Protesters took back public spaces and squares in Beirut and major cities across the country and reorganized the space in a way to ensure long-term occupation of the squares, from public debate tents to sleeping and canteen tents and places for leisure and celebrations.

The occupation of the public squares created a sense of belonging rooted not only in a shared space but also in a shared experience. Through daily practices of solidarity, people contributed largely in sustaining the movement by giving support to the protestors’ physical and mental health needs: they engaged in cooking, collecting and distributing foods as well as providing emergency care and mental support. They organized daily trash and recycling clean up. The social interactions and the shared experiences and solidarities resulting from this street occupation produced a shared emotional connection and a sense of community and ownership. They felt they belong to a common “we” that distinguishes them from a different “other”. This oneness transcended social concentric circles typical to divided societies like Lebanon (Nagle 2015): in a deeply ethnic Lebanon, different communities live on a homogeneous ethnic territory where social relationships are predominantly concentrated within a specific ethnic circle, reducing the possibilities of overlapping with others (Diani 2000). “Some people are unemployed without any income and are poor; others are working and can sustain themselves; others come from the rich class. People from all socioeconomic classes participate in the movements on a daily basis, from all region and from all sectarian belongings,” stated Zeina Karam[13]. Protests created cross-cutting relationships that go beyond sectarian and class divisions and surpass the polarization around sectarian identity.

Contrary to identitarian collective identities, protesters belong to what Flesher Fominaya (2015) defines as autonomous and anti-identitarian movements that refuse to be labeled. They are inclusive and embrace diversity that “allows for truly heterogeneous assemblies (with basic minimums) and attempts to be open to any concerned individual who wants to join in” (Flesher Fominaya 2015, 79). Not only they raised slogans refusing sectarianism, they rejected any link to political and sectarian parties and any label other than “revolutionary”. They focused more on organizing mobilizations, protests and direct actions with the active use of social media. The widespread use of digital technology during the protests also played a significant role in building a collective identity with shared consciousness versus the different “other”.

5. Towards a Popular Identity?

For Laclau (2005b), the process of constructing a collective identity starts with a simple and single social request. The person will not engage in any action if her request is taken into consideration and achieved. However, if the power holders ignore the request or refuse to take action, personal frustration will occur. If this frustration is limited to one person, nothing will happen, but if several individual requests are rejected from the same power holder, a larger section of the society will feel frustrated. More and more people will aggregate around multiple and collective unsatisfied demands, creating what Laclau and Mouffe call “chain of equivalence” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). This chain of equivalence is a key element in the process of building a collective identity: it creates an extensive political front with broad claims and interrelated demands, forming nodal points of identity (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). The chain will link multiple and diversified unfulfilled claims and will crystallize around an “empty signifier” or a common denominator, thus creating oneness around this empty signifier that will be transformed with time into a collective identity.

This transformation is a long process and involves the emergence of myths (Laclau 1990). Myths work as an anchoring point for a variety of social demands that can reach the level of social imaginary, a state where the group goes beyond its personal interests to reach universal level (Laclau 1996). People will not lose their particularities and differences, but will be able to link them to a social imaginary, thus identifying themselves to a larger group that will reach a collective identity. People gain a sense of solidarity and pride that enables them to demand rights as a group and to crystallize around a dichotomy of “us” versus “them”, a crucial element to the process of collective identity creation.

This collective identity is regarded as an act of collective imagination, an "imagined community" (Anderson 2006) that is key not only for social movements and political actions but also to transforming societies into nations. Nation creation relies on myths of shared history, quality and descent and not on what nations really are. In the case of popular identity, the empty nodal points will crystallize around an empty signifier: the people (Laclau 2005a). This popular identity allows individuals to gain a sense of solidarity and pride in oneself and will divide the society in two opposite parts: Us, the people, "the only legitimate populous" (Laclau 2005a, 81) against the other, the power holder.

In the study of social movements, collective identities are recognized as crucial to mobilize movements (Jasper, Tramontano and Aidan 2015). Scholars also recognize several strategies that enable the development of collective identities: in order to recruit more participants and to sustain solidarity and commitments, movements have to strategically frame their identity (Jasper, Tramontano and Aidan 2015). They can choose between a unified and clear frame and a more fluid and deconstructed one. During the peak of October protests,[14] several tents, mostly concentrated in Downtown Beirut, created hubs for grassroots movements to share information and allow fruitful discussions. However, as of today, Lebanese protests lack a clear frame for a unified collective identity. It has been a deliberate strategy by protestors in order to avoid meddling by external players, namely the traditional sectarian power holders. This has weakened the participation of a larger crowd and led even to the exit of core activists.

Another challenge is the essence of identity: Melucci (1995) emphasizes on identity as a process and as a fluid one, suggesting that the content of an identity is not stable and permanent. It is a process of continual identification (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). This fluidity of identity may stir internal contestations whenever differences of opinions and contestation within the group arise (McGarry and Jasper 2015). As well as other social movements, Lebanese protesters groups are contested internally regarding the purpose, strategies and identity of the movements. This leads sometimes to irreconcilable disagreements and even to the destruction of the groups. Movements are also driven by individual ego or ambition of its members, which can also affect the membership and duplicate the efforts. Internal contestations confused the public during 2015 protests, which led to the loss of popular support. Internal contestations also appeared during the 2019 protests and resulted in some activists' withdrawal and people's confusion. According to Maddison (2004), internal conflicts are essential to the success of a movement: internal disputes make room for discussions regarding key topics, such as goals, tactics and action plans. This has the potential to renew and offer more clarity to the movement's vision and purpose and to ensure unity for future collective action.

More than 100 protest groups were created during these protests and since May 2020[15] more and more initiatives have been working to transform the vague dissatisfactions and multiple claims into a set of unified political agenda and demands (Al Fakhry). Lebanese protesters aggregated around a chain of equivalence and as long as the power holders did not satisfy their demands, they are in the process of linking these unsatisfied demands to an empty signifier. Lebanon's protests raised awareness about "we", the people, against "the elite" and mainly their corruption, nepotism and inefficiency. They engendered public debates about democracy, corruption and civil rights. The people as an empty signifier is in the process of polarization into "Us" against "Them" but still lacks a myth and a social imaginary in order to stigmatize a popular collective identity.

6. Conclusion

This paper investigates the potential of protest populism that Lebanon is experiencing to counter the deeply rooted identity populism. We explored the qualitative ethnographic method to capture the fluid, unstable and complex identities and to assess if these protests are leading to a popular identity that would undermine the prevailing and supposedly fixed sectarian identity. We analyzed the social, historical and political context of sectarianism and identity populism in Lebanon and compared analyses and approaches since the 2nd half of the nineteenth century until the ongoing popular protests, covering also the identity dilemma during the declaration of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and the independence of the Lebanese state in 1943. While the protests continue to unfold, the survey technique included immersion in 2019-2020 on-going protests and semi-structured interviews with protesters with a long history of activism in order to capture the complex dynamic of the identity process.

The study provides a contribution to the literature related to the protest populism and popular identity in divided sectarian countries and to the Lebanese context in particular: From a contextual perspective, it is, to our knowledge, the first research on the on-going Lebanese protests that tackles identity in general and the rise of a popular identity. The results challenged the perception about the fixed sectarian Lebanese identity and paved the way for future quantitative research on popular identities as alternative to sectarian identities in ethnic divided societies. Nevertheless, despite the novelty in the analysis of the popular identity in Lebanon, it is crucial to recognize the limitations of the study. Although the ethnographic qualitative approach uncovered the underlying process of the protests and the slow evolution of the Lebanese national identity, the sampling size does not allow us to generalize the results unless a quantitative research based on a representative sample of the Lebanese population. The study doesn't aim to generalize but rather to gain understanding of the potential of the on the on-going protests to shape a popular national identity that can counter sectarian identity. Another major limitation of the study is the constantly evolving process of national identities (Jenkins 2014) and its fluid content (Melucci 1995) making it very difficult to capture specially in the context of on-going protests.

Even though the limitations of the research, the study showed a clear change in the attitudes within the protestors. Lebanon's popular protests are slowly transforming modes and thinking of people's everyday life that reinforces sectarian divisions. These movements upset what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) describe as the "molarities"[16] of social thinking and order: the process through which individuals are assigned into categories by endowing them with a specific identity or theme that delimits change. The technologies of molarity work by promoting territorialization, stratification, organization and basically the enclosure of social groups into specific areas, thus reinforcing division (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). It is reinforced in Lebanon by sectarian populism from the traditional power holders, and increases the chances of border conflicts, civil wars and separatist movement (Metz 2018).

In contrast to molarities, the social movements in Lebanon display the characteristics of molecularity,[17] in reference to fortuitous structures that de-territorialize space, create crosscutting social relationships and destabilize the sectarian identity of the society (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). Even though the political salience of ethnicity limits nonsectarian social movements, they can still transform modes of everyday life and thinking that reinforce social divisions. Focusing on autonomous and anti-identitarian movements that refuse to be labeled, as they are still doing until now, allowed them to escape from the accusations of violating traditional sectarian categorizations.

Nevertheless, the identity dilemmas that social movements in divided societies face are complex. Social change does not happen overnight, and social movements take time and years of planning. Social movements are not parties or unions and cannot be assessed upon their instant impact on political systems. Their main task is to create opportunities for individuals to leave the confinement of their ethnic identities and to opt for alternative identities that transcend traditional sectarian interests (Nagle 2015). In order to deconstruct the sectarian identity and reconstruct a popular identity, social movements should ensure consistency and durability by focusing on strengthening the organizational aspect of the identity rather than the political and ideological ones. The organizational structure of a movement is not the only key to achieve the desired outcomes; it is a goal in itself. Creating cross-cleavage movements in ritualistic forms and re-appropriating symbolic public spaces can ensure momentums and galvanize solidarities. Creating emotional moments of togetherness, empathy and unity allow groups from all sections of society to come together, participate and, above all, feel emotions that will energize collective actions. Emotions are what energizes collective action (Polletta and Jasper 2001) and are essential to the sustainability of the movement. A particular moment of togetherness and overwhelming emotions is the human chain organized all over Lebanon. It showed how this emotional moment reinforced the ideal of unity through diversity and the idea that differences should be celebrated rather than fought against.[18]

Another key element in the process of reconstructing identities is rhetoric. By focusing on oneness, shared values and attitudes, powerful stories and narratives shared on digital media support the process of creating self-consciousness and social imaginary. The power of narrative can be widely used to stress out and amplify the dichotomy of “us”, the people, as a homogeneous category against “them”, the victimizers and power holders’ elite. By establishing intentionally populist rhetoric around “we” against “them”, these grassroots movements can create an inclusive populism that seeks to create unity between divided sectarian groups around the same political issue, thus undermining the sectarian identity dueled by sectarian populism.

In Lebanon, the sectarian ruling elites are still ignoring the requests of the people and focusing on preserving their interests, giving time to popular protests to structure themselves and gain maturity in framing their popular identity. However, this process is still underway and still has many challenges and several stages to undergo. They must clearly frame their popular identity, demonstrate institutional failure, and organize grassroots emotional momentums and debates in order to advance their agenda, develop a populist rhetoric, educate the people and gain their support. If the Lebanese succeed to re-categorize themselves more in a term of an inclusive popular identity, then, despite sectarian differences, they can start to see themselves as part of a common national group with positive attributes.

Notes

1. The Cedar revolution that took place in 2005 after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri is not part of our study. Although protestors contested the sectarian system, we consider it mainly as a top-down action initiated by traditional sectarian parties and leaders. It ended by splitting protestors between two camps based on their confessional and political affiliations: pro-west March 14 (Sunni and Christian) and pro-Syrian occupation March 8 (Shi’a and Christian). Another mobilization, during the Arab protests in 2011 will not be part of the study too as it was sporadic and failed to gain traction.
2. 12 Christian communities (Maronite, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East, Chaldean Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Syriac Orthodox and Protestant), 4 Muslim communities (Sunni, Shiites, Isma'ili, Alawite), Druze and Jewish.
3. Four Maronite, three Druze, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sunni Muslim and one Shi’a Muslim.
4. Lebanon’s golden age started in the mid-fifties until the civil war in 1975.

5. One of the country's main Christian Maronite leader and president of the republic of Lebanon between 1952 and 1958.

6. A Pan-Arab nationalist ideology based on the thinking of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

7. Current president of the Lebanese republic and previous commander of the Lebanese army. He was appointed as interim prime minister between 1988 and 1990 when he led the "War of Liberation" against the Syrian army established in Lebanon. He rejected the Tai'f Agreement in 1990 and was forced into exile in France by Syrian forces.

8. Current leader of the Lebanese Forces Party and previous right-wing Christian militia.

9. The Revolution in Arabic, as it is called by the protesters.

10. The Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, the Socialist Arab Lebanon Vanguard Party, the People's Movement and The Democratic Youth Union (the youth organization of the Lebanese Communist Party).

11. Jihad Nammour is a professor of Political Sciences at Saint Joseph University. Previous member of "Sakarit El Dekkane", an anti-corruption activist group, he considers himself as a militant citizen. He has actively participated to the protests since 2005 and was engaged alongside Saint Joseph University's students and tents in Downtown Beirut.

12. Chawki El Fakhry is a civil engineer, an activist and founding member of the Civil Center for National Initiative. He is advocating for a civil state in Lebanon and the creation of a senate to separate religion from civil status.

13. Zeina Karam is an activist involved in several movements and organizations (Irap, Farah El Ataa, Beirut Madinati). She lived for 30 years in France and returned in the early 2000s to Lebanon and supported grassroots movements.

14. October, November and December.

15. After the confinement related to the outbreak of the Covid-19.

16. Re-appropriated from molarity used in chemistry to denote the concentration of a substance in a liquid.

17. Molecularity in chemistry denotes the mechanism in which two reacting species or more combine in the transition state.

18. According to discussions with participants during the human chain.

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Populism-style and strategy of communication. The Romanian case

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Abstract: In the actual economic and political globalized context and fast changing *mediascape,* the study of populist political communication has never been more challenging. The purpose of this text is to provide information about the conditions that have given rise to the presence of populist political communication in different European democracies in general, and in Romania in particular.

At the turn of the third millennium, Cas Mudde (Mudde 2004) argued that the growing success of populist parties had triggered the emergence of a "populist Zeitgeist" in Western Europe, a development consisting of an increasing adoption of populist messages by mainstream parties and politicians. In fact, almost all liberal democracies are affected by some sort of populism either in *discursive style and strategy* (Jagers/Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 2016; Wodak 2018 etc.) or as '*thin ideology*' (Mudde 2004).

If populist analysts distinguish several types of populism: i) the ideational one, centered on ideological content (Mudde 2017); ii) a strategic political approach (Weyland 2017) and iii) a socio-cultural approach (Ostiguy 2017), there are also intersectional perspectives that combine ideas and discourse strategies. From this perspective, which is the perspective we adopt also, populism can be understood as the discursive manifestation of a thin ideology focused on a set of basic assumptions about the world expressed by a rhetoric of oppositions, hyperbolas and polarizations (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; de Vreese and al. 2018).

In order to explain the increase of populist actors and discourses we propose as basic assumption the correlation media/mediatized content (dramatization, negativization and spectacularization), scrutinized through a quantitative and qualitative approach (i.e.content analysis and discourse analysis) answering the following research questions (in an inductive empirical manner):

RQ1: How is represented quantitatively the dynamics of the antagonist Manichean populist content in a specific context (*Salvați Roșia Montană* FB page)?

RQ2: How is thematized verbally and iconically the street movement *Salvați Roșia Montană* on the FB page?

Key words: *populist style, populist strategy, populist content, Social media, Romanian social movements.*

1. Introduction

By presenting itself as a representation (‘emanation’) of the People and expression of its will, populism is experiencing a dizzying expansion throughout Europe. From the *Independence Party* in Great Britain to *Podemos* in Spain or *Movimento 5 Stelle* in Italy, to name a few, current social parties and movements present themselves as challengers to the current system and the actors who occupy it. Looked condescendingly or anxiously by *status quo* politicians, but hopefully invested by skeptical citizens disappointed by traditional political institutions (which no longer "represent anyone"), populism is changing the balance of power across Europe.

"Identity tensions, partisan rivalries, protest mobilizations" (Ihl et al. 2003, 10) have contributed to promoting populism, even threatening democracy. The effects of exclusion and social fracture cannot be separated from the development of populisms. “Populist virus” (in the language of journalists about the situation in the Netherlands in 2002), “populist temptation” in the title of an academic synthesis, the emphasis on the people, opposed to corrupt elites infrastructures heterogeneous trends and discourses from the Americas and Europe. This is why some prefer to speak of a *populist contagion* (Bale and al. 2010). Mudde (2004, 563; Roventa-Frumusani, Stefanel 2019) affecting the discourse of many political actors who bet on affectivity, the personalization of action (the charismatic leader) and the sacralization of the people.

A long-disputed, “ambivalent concept” (Kaltwasser 2012), populism has been associated in Western Europe especially with far-right parties, and in Latin America with left-wing protest movements, both based on the antagonistic rhetoric of the people/elite (in Europe) and exclusion of outsiders/inclusion of insiders (in Latin America).

The contemporary expansion of populist leaders, parties and discourses as well as "the new populisms" are to be rethought within the cleavages and reconfigurations within nationalisms, the emergence of cultural, ethnic, religious identities, the weakness of the Nation State and the disintegration of the habermasian public sphere in favor of fragmented public spheres, result of the digital revolution.

The essence of populism in this new context is represented less by fixed ideological content than by a rhetorical modality of recreating collective identities by antagonization (Gherghina and Miscoiu 2010, 66).

The populism of the last quarter century appeared as much in the form of right-wing populism in the countries of the North confronted with the influx of migrants and minorities as in that of left-wing populism in the countries of the South (explainable by the communist roots in the post-communist countries and by a strong communist accent in countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain) finds a powerful electoral support in all Europe, West and East. According to Mudde (Mudde 2004), Western Europe adopts and adapts a populist *Zeitgeist* and given that populist parties win votes, mainstream parties are increasingly using populist rhetoric.

There is already a multitude of analyses devoted to the 'response' of traditional parties to the electoral success of populist parties (Mudde 2007; Rooduijn 2014; Van Spanje 2010, among others), but which focused on Western Europe and the influence of right-wing populism, leaving aside the Eastern European part of the European Union and the growing influence of left-wing populism. We intend to explore this populist dimension in post-communist countries, in this case Romania.

The case of Romania is significant for understanding populism, an expanding phenomenon at European level and elsewhere; the slow modernization of the end of the XIXth century, the rapid industrialization of the tumultuous XXth-century as well as the traumatic transition to democracy of the ex-communist countries in the first decade of the third millennium contributed to the maintenance of a populist discourse sometimes aggressive, visible, sometimes latent, but still present in the Romanian public sphere. Our analysis also tries to see to what extent the new media and the shift from the public sphere to the virtual public sphere contributes to the permanence of populist discourse in Romanian politics. We propose to analyze the way in which the traditional Romanian parties (the Social Democratic Party on the left and the National Liberal Party on the right) modify their electoral discourses under the pressure of actors recently entered in the political arena – USR (Union Save Romania), and a new player, extremely important in Romania- the street.

2. Conceptualizations of Populism

From Caracas to Budapest via Washington and Rome, understanding of politics must take into account a phenomenon that until recently was studied as a subspecies of fascism (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, 33) and relegated to the margins of the West, mainly Latin America (Finchelstein and Urbinati 2018). Another novelty is its reception by scholars and citizens. While until the end of the 20th century, interest in populism was most keen among those who saw it as a problem (Taguieff 1997; Taggart 2000; Mény and Surel 2002), researchers and citizens began to see it not only as a symptom of the decline of representative institutions but also as an opportunity to rejuvenate democracy (Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2016).

2.1 Globalization of populism

As populism becomes a global challenge, it is not surprising that scientific literature on populism has been growing (Aalberg et al. 2017; de la Torre 2015; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012b; Couvrat et Thériault 2014; Moffitt 2016; Rovira-Kaltwasser et al. 2017). The concept has been discussed theoretically (Canovan 1981; Wievorka 1993; Taguieff 1995; Taguieff 1998; Taggart 2000; Hermet 2001; Mény and Surel 2000; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde 2004) and methodologically empirically (Aalberg et al. 2017; de Vreese et al. 2018; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Rooduijn, De Lange and Van der Brug 2014; Hawkins 2009; Engesser et al. 2017; Gerbaudo 2014; Marinescu 2020; Frumuşani and Stefănel 2019, 2020). The complexity of the relationship between populism and democracy is reflected in theory and practice. In essence, populism is not against democracy; it is rather against liberal democracy (in Mudde's formula "Populism-threat or corrective of democracy").

Populism strongly defends popular sovereignty and the rule of the majority, but opposes minority rights and pluralism. Populism in power has led to processes of de-democratization (for example Orbán in Hungary or Chávez in Venezuela) and, in some extreme cases, even to the collapse of the democratic regime (for example Fujimori in Peru) (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017, 96). For Mudde populism is sometimes a 'corrective of democracy' since it allows the general mobilization of the people, but also a threat to democracy by the supremacy of the charismatic leader (too often authoritarian).

In the current context of growing success of populist parties, the generalization of social media and the phenomenon of personalization of politics, the existing literature has not sought whether the political communication of the leaders of populist and non-populist parties is going through a homogenization or a differentiation process. Significantly, this point seems crucial to assess whether and how a populist *Zeitgeist* really permeates the communication of political leaders, who are undoubtedly the most influential and visible actors in the politics of contemporary parties (Garzia 2014; Zulianello et al. 2018).

2.2 Populism: ambivalence and controversies

Populism is still much more controversial than analytical, often a battle name to mark and stigmatize political movements and leaders (D'Eramo 2013) or a marker of those who use it for the purpose to claim the liberal democratic model as the only valid form that democracy can take (Müller 2016). Finally, especially after the Brexit referendum (June 23, 2016), politicians and media experts call all opposition movements 'populists', from xenophobic nationalists to critics of neoliberal policies. That is why analysts distinguish between nationalistic populism, cyberpopulism, populism as plebeian politics, radical left populism, right wing populism etc. (Mudde 2020).

As a scientific term populism is an extremely contested notion, based on several sciences: political sciences, economic sciences, social sciences, linguistics, covering vast zones and perspectives such as modernization theory, social movement theory, political psychology, political economy, political sociology, democratic theory (Ionescu & Gellner 1969; Canovan 2002; Hawkins 2009; Marinescu 2020).

In the absence of an academic consensus regarding populism, it seems that the only characteristic on which analysts have come to an agreement have in common the opposition of two antagonistic homogeneous groups: “the pure people” and the corrupt elite (Mudde 2004; Albertazzi, and O'Donnell 2008 *inter alii).* In this work we adopt the definition of Danielle Albertazzi and Duncan O'-Donnell (Albertazzi and O’Donnell 2008, 3):

> [Populism] … pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity, and voice.

2.3 Populism: ideology, style and strategy

Populism is an ambiguous term that escapes uncontested definitions, because "it is neither an ideology nor a political regime and cannot be attributed to a specific programmatic content", but rather a form of collective action aimed at increasing power (Urbinati 2017, 2).

Yet populism is more than a rhetorical style and a political protest. Therefore, a political theory of populism must focus on the populism in power and on the way in which populism interprets, uses and modifies representative democracy.

Cas Mudde has contributed the most to defining the ideological framework within a normative minimalism. He argues that populism is «like a thin ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (the general will) of the people» (Mudde 2004, 543). Capable of overlapping the left/right division, the movements are populist due to their Manichean moral appreciation of politics.

According to Kurt Weyland (Weyland 2001, 14), populism is "best defined as a political strategy by which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated and uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers".

In previous research, populism has been defined as an *ideology* (Mudde 2004), a *political style* (Bos and Brants 2014), or a *communication strategy* (Jagers and Walgrave 2007) and is generally considered a vague and difficult concept to define (Canovan 1999). More recently content and style interfere in order to create a discourse strategy aiming power and legitimacy; in fact populists as well as journalists use dramatization, negativity and emotional tone to highlight the failure of the elite and the necessity of change (Bos and Brants 2014; Wettstein 2018). The strongest predictors for the populist style are the identity of the actor and party and the populist content of statements (Wettstein 2018).

Following the same discursive dimension, Margaret Canovan (Canovan 1981, 4) identifies three discursive elements that characterize any form of populism:

i) exaltation of the people characterized as honest, sincere, courageous, moral and wise;
ii) call for the emancipation, modernization and even revolt of this same people, call launched by populist leaders who are like the "people" and share its values;
iii) anti-elitism as a constituent element which allows radical criticism of the status quo and the definitive positioning of the populist leader on the side of the masses.

By synthesizing populist literature, we can affirm that a populist discourse must be homogeneous, based on two antagonistic entities (the people and the elite) and Manichean dichotomies (virtue/vs/corruption); the tone is emotional, affective and not rational-objective; the solutions proposed are simple, reductionist and utopian, and the accent falls on the myths and structures of the imaginary and not on argumentation and debate.

3. The Romanian Populism

3.1 The first postcommunist decade

Many analyzes (Tismaneanu 1999; Gherghina and Miscoiu 2010 *inter alii*) highlight the fact that the first post-revolutionary years are to be placed under the sign of populism rather than under that of democracy. Besides, the populist elements are found in the manifestos and political speeches of the Romanian Revolution as well as in the speeches of the political formations resulting from the revolution. The name *Front* is preferred to that of Party, transforming a common name into a proper name - “direct evocation of the link with the official, revolutionary genealogy, symbol of a new solidarity” (Soare 2010, 101).

In fact the *National Salvation Front* (FSN) and its charismatic leader Ion Iliescu frequently use populist discourse both to detach themselves from the Romanian Communist Party from which many leaders come, and to maintain themselves in power despite the strong contestation manifested by the traditional (liberal and Christian) parties reappeared in the first months of 1990.The conspiracy myth, the serious accusations against the leaders of the anti-communist parties who had taken refuge in the West, the labeling of the University Square protesters as *golani* (hooligans) and the correction of their “deviance” by citizens characterized by a “high civic spirit” – the miners (armed with batons) are some of the populist nationalist discursive strategies of FSN.

From the center to the periphery the populist discourse becomes more radical; the minor partners of the FSN adopt an aggressive nationalist-populist discourse; that is why they become hardly acceptable partners for the ruling party PDSR engaged in the way towards democracy. The loss of the elections by Ion Iliescu (1996) and the entry of “the red quadrilateral” in the opposition marks a clear dissociation of the PDSR from the nationalist-populist discourse on one side, and on the other the radicalization of the discourse of Corneliu Vadim-Tudor (leader of the populist nationalist party *Greater Romania*); this discourse will propel four years later C. V. Tudor into the position of challenger in the presidential elections.

3.2 The second postcommunist decade

When in 2000 Vadim Tudor lost the presidential elections (against him having joined all the democratic forces which supported Ion Iliescu in the second round) and as the European course of Romania became more and more evident, the populist discourse loses ground and takes refuge in marginal areas of the political sphere, from where it reappears in force as Traian Băsescu traces his ascent to the most important dignity in Romanian politics - the presidency.

Traian Basescu captured Vadim Tudor's electorate by a speech similar to Vadim Tudor's speech, marked by a strong personalization and self-presentation as "one among many". At the moment when in his fight against the Parliament and the Government appear non-democratic dimensions, and and he constantly appeals to the people, we can talk about the populist Traian Basescu. "Să ne întoarcem la Popor" ("Let's go back to the people") requests Traian Băsescu each time the Parliament takes decisions other than those he wishes - for example when 322 parliamentarians voted for its suspension (in 2007).

To a populist discourse legitimized by the popular vote it is difficult to answer with a democratic discourse; it is by pragmatic symmetry that populism slips into the speeches of the allies as well as those of opponents of Basescu: politicians, journalists, civil society actors. At the end of the two presidential terms, of Traian Basescu (2005-2014) it can be said that his true heritage is the enormous popularity of the populist rhetoric: politicians at all levels unreservedly adopt this rhetoric, the electorate savor it as a grotesque spectacle where we break taboos and use vulgar, heavy words. But actors in the Romanian political spectrum do not seem to understand the dangers of this rhetoric for the fragile Romanian democracy.

3.3 New millennium-new technologies and the new political sphere

During the last decade of the twentieth century, dominated by television, the public was passive, its involvement in the political media space was reduced to the vote itself and to the statistics that measure the audience. Politics is the spectacle narrated by the mass media and followed live by audience niches; it is the spectacle which attracts attention by its ambiguity and the richness of the meanings which can be associated with it (Edelmann 1999, 183).

Aware of the spectacular context (politics on television), political actors seek their legitimacy not within parties, but in television studios. Career paths are not played only within parties. The appearance on television in the spotlight, hoping for rapid notoriety, is preferred to the slow pace of party life.

The value of a politician is no longer automatically associated with his experience; the telegenie becomes the reference value. Political actors play their role by taking less account of the ideology and rather of the constraints of the television studio, knowing that a transgression of the television rules can lead to the disappearance of political life.

The political media space where the need for visibility takes precedence transforms politicians into actors subject to scenographic and staging rules whose underestimation or ignorance lead to marginalization, the political actor must think about his actions events which can be used and transmitted by the media.

If the impact of traditional media and especially television has been the subject of a great deal of research, studies on new technologies and their impact on politics are only at the beginning. What can be said *ab initio* is the fact that ordinary people are more informed and more active through new technologies.

It is not only the media and politicians who set the agenda in the new technology era, anyone who has a telephone with video camera and internet access can become a producer of information.

On the other hand, even if the enthusiasm continues at high ratings, a series of criticisms appear concerning the impact of new technologies. The mobilization capacity of these media can have a detrimental effect on politics. Crowds can be manipulated toward the destruction of democracy in the name of democracy itself. In a proverbial formulation the best (in our case participatory democracy) can be the enemy of the good (the representative democrat).

Some researchers claim that the consumption opportunities created by the internet increase consumerism and favor the market economy, but affect the spirit of tolerance of citizens frustrated by the lack of civic values that they share with others, different culturally; if we support consumer sovereignty and praise the un-limited power of the internet to filter information, it is possible to think of freedom as the satisfaction of private preferences. It is obvious that the freedom to choose is fundamental but the choice must be made after having gathered a sufficient amount of information and having analyzed a wide and varied set of options. Devoid of formal censorship and informal rules of online behavior, it becomes the space of harsh expression and reductionist-populist divisions between them and US.

4. Research and analysis methodology

The present article has an exploratory character and uses methodological triangulation. More specifically we have used a methodological triangulation: quantitative content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis.

At the very beginning early scientists (especially in the United States) were sympathetic towards populism (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012), but further developments of the populist research added only negative connotations. Recent cross-cultural investigations (Dwayne Woods 2014; de Vreese 2018) emphasized the multiple openings of this thin ideology, political strategy and rhetoric discourse (de Vreese et al. 2018, 424):

> Populism might broaden the attention for issues that are not in the mainstream news. Populism might mobilize groups of people that have felt on the fringe of the political system. Populism might improve the responsiveness of the political system by making actors and parties align their policies more with the “wishes of the people.

As previuos researches have emphasized (Hawkins 2010; Wettstein et al 2018) populist politics can change the type of political mobilization, increase the development of social movements and reshape party structure and agency.That is why we have choosen to analyze a street protest based on participant observation and the analysis of the Facebook page associated with the *Uniți Salvăm!* (*Unite we save*) movement, broad protest movement from September to December

2013. (*Unite We Save* is the name used on social media networks during the protest).

We propose to answer the following research questions:

- RQ1: How is represented quantitatively the dynamics of the antagonist Manichean populist content in a specific context (*Salvați Roșia Montană* FB page)*?*
- RQ2: How is thematized verbally and iconically the street movement *Salvați Roșia Montană* on the FB page?

Starting from the main semantic populist indicators we observed, quantified and analyzed:

- *The Exaltation of the People*

and the sign of equality between the will of the protesters and the will of the People as a whole. At the same time we have tried to highlight the characteristics of this People and the negotiations of the meanings which modify the negative factors (such as lack of civic experience and involvement) in positive attributes.

- *The call for emancipation and revolt against the corrupt elites*

focusing our attention on actions which go beyond the democratic framework and which include all the politicians of the same category homogenized and demonized at the same time In addition, we focused on the discursive structures which accentuate the impetus of the revolt and the importance of the immediate action („now or never”).

- *Demonization of politicians*

We highlighted the antagonizing discursive structures, which put the People and the Elites in opposition by denying any possibility of negotiation between the two categories. We also emphasize the negative characteristics of politicians and the modality in which foreign structures (national or super-state also) are associated with evil and corruption.

- *The existence (or necessity) of a Leader*

who incorporates the will of the people and struggles with the corrupt Elites. We start from the premise that a characteristic of populism fueled by socialization networks is the absence of a leader and even the rejection of any hierarchical structure. The existence of this leader would be a sign of populism; the rejection of this idea of neopopulism. Graphically, the structure that we consider nationalist-populist and that we are trying to deconstruct is the following (Figure 1):

Leader: Embody the people Exceptional Saviour	**Crisis situation:** Now or never Exceptional	**Elite:** Corrupt Vicious
People: Pure Virtuous		**Others** (foreigners)**:** Bastards With their own agenda Corrupt

Figure 1. Graphic representation of the analysis grid

We also consider as populist the discursive elements which have the role of eliciting emotional reactions either positive (adhesion, love etc.) or negative (fury, hatred, contempt etc.) as well as the use of classic political myths and associated imaginary structures.

The analysis corpus consists of posts on the Facebook page *Uniți, Salvam*! and the comments to these posts during the period September 1, 2013 - December 31, 2013 (Tabel 1).

The quantitative results emphasize the fact that from September to December the number of posted texts and photos doubled (57 vs 107 texts and 57 vs 107 photos). As for the FB reactions the shared messages 1000 each month (and this explains the huge mobilization), the maximum number of likes also remains high, but not the number of comments (what counts is action – presence in the street and not discourse).

We must mention the fact that the street movements diminished in size since end November 2013, but the Facebook page remained active, succeeding in coagulating smaller protest movements throughout 2014 and 2015. Anyhow the dynamics is growing during the first three months.

We must also stress the fact that the main contributors to this page are not the same throughout the period. A member of the movement informed us that when the page became radicalized and between the on-line movement and the offline manifestation appeared discrepancies, reciprocal accusations occurred, accusations which went so far as to betray the spirit of the movement.

Corpus		**September**	**October**	**November**	**December**
Total number of posts	Texte	57	78	64	107
	Photos	57	74	61	104
	Video	12	29	14	18
	Total	57	78	65	113
Like	Average	279	340	491	315
	Maximum	1402	1996	1528	1211
comments	Average	38	103	92	61
	Maximum	107	264	299	132
Share	Average	234	298	174	153
	Maximum	1007	1292	984	1018

Table 1: Synthetic data of the corpus submitted for analysis

4.1 Brief presentation of the protest movement

The protest movement generically named *Salvați Roșia Montană (Save Rosia Montana*) or *Toamna Românească (Romanian Autumn*) sprang from a backdrop of popular discontent with the chaos of the Romanian political scene accentuated by the incapacity of the Social Liberal Union (USL) to develop for the citizens the enormous confidence that they had in 2012: first of all, the street protests led to the fall of the Ungureanu government (January 2013), then in July on the occasion of the referendum on the resignation of the President Basescu the mobilization was enormous and third, in November during the parliamentary elections the presence at the polls and the majority in favor of the Union was overwhelming.

The issue of preventing the vote in Parliament of a law that would facilitate the mining of Roșia Montană (a village in a traditional area of Transylvania) - was the pretext for the revolt since the subject was present in the Romanian public space for more than 15 years; moreover, a statement of Traian Băsescu in the 2009 electoral campaign when he declared his support for mining in the same area did not trigger the same protests.

Besides, just after the start of the revolt, other themes appeared:, some directly derived from the theme of mining (the anti-capitalist theme), others indirectly (nationalist-extremist demands).

4.2 Results. RQ2. Verbal and iconic actualizations

4.2.1 Exaltation of the People: the myth of the unity and of the Golden Age

From the first posts on the page we can notice the assimilation of the will of the People with the will of those who protest and the discredit of those who do not get involved (*the great majority of Romanians are sheep* comment on 10 December.This association with sheep is limited at the beginning, the non participants should be helped not blamed, in letting the traitors of all parties fight for their own interests and not for an old population incapable to affirm its national identity in the list of The new European values - comment on 4th September).



Uniți Salvăm a distribuit fotografia postată de Doru Oprisan.
15 Decembrie 2013 ·

Berea o platim noi

Doru Oprisan

#unitisalvam [15.12.2013]
Principala problema a poporului roman: zidul.

(Precizare: fotografia reprezinta o realitate de o clipa. Nu judecati prea dur grupul din stanga pentru ca nu le cunoastem povestea. Poate au fost pana acum in fiecare saptamana la protest. Sau poate nu. Nu conteaza. Eu m-am folosit de prezenta lor acolo ca sa transmit un mesaj general.
Imaginea este reala. Interpretarile sunt subiective.)

Image 1. Image suggesting the cleavage of the Romanian society (10 Dec).

As the movement grew those who do not participate are discredited and excluded from the body of citizens (see the post attached to the photo opposite. - Beer is us who pay! - Image 1[1]). In other words the indolence of those who prefer the tranquility of beer to the tumult of the street costs us all, but the protesters bear the cost.

The evolution of this theme can be summarized as follows (Table 2):

Theme: unity of the People	**September**	**October**	**November**	**December**
Mobilisation	Strong mobilization	Strong mobilization	Moderate mobilization	Very strong mobilization
	„How strong Bucharest people can be when they can all think the same” (comment, Sept 9); „Whoever gets up in the morning saves Roșia Montană and stops the abuse. In Parlament, we are now protesting against the mining law! Come, you too! Together we can defend what belongs to us We are more numerous again than they think!” (post 10 dec).			
Blame	moderate	moderate	strong	strong
	„The Romanians do not seem to know how to protest. We are like a large flock of sheep” (comment, November 29) „If a quarter of the people who were at Bucharest Christmas Market (why not Craciun? Noel in Romanian our note) - without knowing why stopped, the message would have been better heard. But unfortunately sausages and wine remain the priorities of the majority of Romanians” (comment-7 dec).			

Table 2: Summary of the evolution of the theme of People's Unity in the posts and comments of the *Uniți Salvăm* page during the period September-December 2013.

We have used the scale: non-existent, moderated, strong and very strong.It should be noted that from the title of the page the Union appears rather as a desideratum than a reality of current society. So beyond the usual cleavages of populist discourse we notice another antagonization: that between the demonstrators and the silent majority like a flock of sheep and blameable for the tacit support (indirect-no involvement or direct-vote) of the current political class (Image 2[2]).


JOS LUPII
DEGEABA, FRATE! ORICUM NU SCHIMBI NIMIC...
Salvati ROSIA MONTANA

Image 2. Image of the population not involved in the protests.

The portrait of the protestors as it results from the analysis of the page is: „young, beautiful and free" (formula consecrated in the Romanian public space to designate the protesters; formula adopted also pejoratively on certain occasions by those who challenged the legitimacy of the movement, especially in traditional media). Young people are mannered, educated and creative (posts grouped in the album *The art of protest*).

Creativity exploses in many fun sequences, assumed by specific gestures such as behaviors associated with childhood (dwarfs - Image 3[3]; riding a bicycle - Image 4).


LĂSAȚI AURUL UNDE L-AU ASCUNS SPIRIDUȘII

Image 3. Demonstration with the slogan "lăsați aurul acolo unde l-au ascuns spiridușii" ("let the gold where the dwarfs have hidden it").

Young people want to preserve unaltered nature but also emphasize the need for a new era that reconciles people with themselves, the others and the environment.

The original moment we are referring to is the Romanian revolution, the pure moment of the beginnings, corrupted by politicians unable to rise to that level, but recreated by the participants in the movement. This recovery of the revolution is taking place in two directions: demonstrators towards the revolutionaries (the descendants of those who fought in December) and conversely from the revolutionaries towards the demonstrators What again can make it fit into a populist structure is its homogenizing and dichotomous nature: only those who are on the street are the heirs of the demonstrators of 1989; the voice of the 1989 revolution is assumed only by those who support this movement, the others are the traitors of the spirit of the revolution.

cristian vasile

Image 4. Panoramic image of the first protests, bicycles in the foreground (personal archive of the authors - FB photo has been removed)

4.2.2 Emancipation by revolt

It is obvious that the dominant theme of the whole period is *the need for change*, a change that can only come from revolt because all the actors - Government, Presidency, Parliament but also Gendarmerie, Advocate of the People and even political parties - are incapable of emancipation.

We consider that this change transcends democratic limits and can be designated as populist insofar as the change is not the result of the vote but of pressures from the street. An example in this sense is the occupation of the headquarters of the People's Advocate by the protesters (10 dec) given their determination to force a decision to attack the Mines Law (Image 5[4].)

NU VREM MAINILE LEGATE !
STOP
EXPROPRIERI FORTATE !

Image 5. Occupation of *Avocatul Poporului* (Advocate of the People) headquarters by demonstrators.

This type of populism acts in a mimetic way instead of the more difficult, longer and harder legal and institutional path to follow in all its bureaucratic meandres. In the image alongside, a group of filmmakers associated with the movement and appreciated by the movement occupied the CNC (National Center of Cinematography) to protest against the incorrect and arbitrary allocation of funds (Image 6[5]).

Image 6. Occupation of the CNC by dissatisfied filmmakers.

4.2.3 Who are the enemies: the political elite, internal and international institutions, the media

From the very beginning of the movement, ministers considered guilty of promoting the mining law Victor Ponta, Dan Șova are in the foreground, but dissolved in the collective guilt of the political class in its entirety. What is more, guilt is not limited but widened to the 24 years of government which was the misfortune of the country. The evolution of the theme of guilt is shown in the table below (Table 3):

Theme: guilt of the political class	**September**	**October**	**November**	**December**
Guilty political figures	moderated	nonexistant	nonexistant	moderated
	Politicians found guilty of situation created *Victor Ponta, Dan Șova, Rovana Plumb, Daniel Barbu et Gheorghe Duțu* Take responsibility and resign. We want you to be investigated (banner posted on September 26).			
Collective culprits	Strong	Very strong	Very strong	Strong
	„Meet this cyanurist clan. It's bigger than it seems, it has infiltrated and pollutes the Special Commission. Their degree of involvement in activities supporting the mining project varies from initiation of laws favorable for the mining company to manipulative partisan and propaganda statements” (posted September 18).			

Table 3**.** Evolution of the populist theme of corrupt elites in the period analyzed.

Parliament is the main culprit (including all parties); it represents the main structure which must be destroyed eventually in its own cyanide to secure a future for Romania-banner posted on 13 Décember - Image 7[6]).



Image 7. Octopus Parliament.

Besides, politicians on the whole are judged and condemned: „Attention leeched politicians There is not only gold and silver, there are also handcuffs ”(text of a banner photographed during demonstrations and posted September 20).

Next to the Romanian politicians appears a series of figures associated with conspiratorial Otherness:



Image 8. Symbolic visual structure associated with the myth of the conspiracy.

- at the individual level: George Soros (evil character in the Romanian collective mind, associated with the myth of the Hungarian conspiracy) participates in a secret meeting with Victor Ponta, in London;
- at the national one: Canada globally, considering that the *Gold Corporation*, company which wants to exploit the gold of Roșia Montana is founded in this country; the United States whose interests associated with consumerims are seen as illegitimate (Image 8[7]).
- and transnational one: FMI and the European Union seen as traitors and oppressors of the Romanian people.

Developing the populist theme of press moguls used by Traian Băsescu during his two presidential terms, the movement revolts against the traditional press seen as part of the corrupt system, incapable of presenting the situations objectively. The solution is provided by the international press (from the same countries that are part of the Conspiracy, but mythical thought sometimes plays with logic) and civic journalism. Protest participants are encouraged to present what is happening off line live, online; those who are online are asked to distribute in the real and the virtual („Announce your neighbors, your colleagues, your family and your friends” - banner posted on September 8) .

4.2.4 The rejection of the leader –emblem of neo populism

During the entire period analyzed, we did not distinguish dominant voices either in the online or offline environment. Coordination is collective, everyone is invited to participate, people are mobilized to contribute as they wish, to express themselves freely. What is more, any attempt at individualization or to assume in own name the movement is severely punished (Image 10[8]).



Image 10. “Mugur Călinescu, the real anonymous”.

5. Conclusion

In line with numerous recent researches we found that *people-centrism, anti-elitism, collective mobilization are main elements of the populist communication*. Populist actors use populist communication as a means to an end. The important political aims are power, legitimacy and mobilization (easily achieved by direct connection). If in the first televisual era the role played by the charismatic leader was significant, in neo-populism the real people is anonymous, in the street and transmits live the protests, marches, events.

We also consider that “populist content and populist style tend to go together” (Kriesi 2018, 13) by providing “a dynamic mix of substance and style” (Wodak 2015, 3) and plead for a new generation of research on populist political communication, with the aim to push the research agendas and design toward a more interactive, systematic, and in particular, *comparative* approach to the study of populist political communication infrastructure by polarization (Mudde, Kaltwaser 2018; de Vreese 2018).

Nowadays populist affordances center “the people” to various degrees, and engage in a “technological performance of populism across a variety of platforms, including email, Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and campaign-created mobile apps” (Baldwin-Philippi, 2018).

The political transitions of the former Eastern Europe, the emergence of a cyberdemocracy and a public hypersphere (Pierre Levy 2011), the extension of new digital mechanisms in all spheres determine permanent reconfigurations of the social world, ambiguities and challenging hybridizations.

In an era where “time has no patience” (Romanian writer Marin Preda), *populist mobilizations* function as warning signs for out-of-phase rulers (and governed), tending to bypass bureaucratic institutional procedures (given the ineffective action of “democratic” political mediation).

It is not accidental that, in the process of naming and shaming “enemies” from within, the *communication played an important role* (Aalberg et al. 2017; de Vreese et al. 2018) and the discursive strategies analyzed here, with their heavy reliance on emotion, and popular expressions, work in combination “to anchor just such a narrative in people’s hearts and minds” (Breeze 2020,16).

This analysis consolidates the conclusions of an important number of recent researches concerning the strong need for a comparative, systematic and global populist communication perspective which takes us beyond the particularity of case studies (de Vreese and al. 2018, 427). When leaders and authoritarian-populist parties gain ground (Trump, Brexit etc), one must study and understand the roots of populist discourse in this global context of cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart 2019); populism continues to represent a strong alert potential for governments with little responsibility, but also a threat to the institutions of liberal democracy and the political culture that underpins democracy (see also Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012).

It is imperative not to consider social media platforms and populism in isolation, but interrelated, depending on context and connection “as platforms of sharing, disseminating, escalating, and expressing views as part of a larger information system (de Vreese 2018, 132). Moreover, like in the 60's ("les structures descendent dans la rue", "the structures take to the streets"), we plead for discourse and action, for information and mobilization.

In line with previous researches we point out the necessity to anchor further analyses on the binaries of populism "us versus them," "the people" versus the "the elite", the moral connotation of a "certain discursive style and form of mobilization" (Woods 2014, 16) in a broader verbal-iconic framework.

Notes

1. *Uniti Salvăm.* Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=10201496369830965&set
2. *Uniti Salvăm.* Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/584470591594972;
3. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/588859361156095;
4. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/626492367392794;
5. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/627863033922394;
6. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/627512710624093;
7. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/584464108262287;
8. *Uniti Salvăm*. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/unitisalvam/photos/587856941256337;

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L'agressivité des médias - quo vadis?

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Abstrait: Brièvement, l'agressivité est définie comme le comportement par lequel sont produits une souffrance intentionnelle et/ou un préjudice physique et/ou psychique. Une première classification des manifestations agressives les délimite en termes physiques et verbaux.

Les théories explicatives actuelles de l'agressivité postulent son caractère instinctif et inné; son déclenchement par des techniques d'influence et de provocation; ainsi que sa potentialisation par frustration et certains facteurs environnementaux.

Le modèle d'apprentissage social de l'agressivité (Bandura, 1977) a une large diffusion et utilité.

Mots clés: médias, l'agressivité, enfants, la communication, la télévision.

1.L’expérience „Bobo Doll” (1961)[1]

À l’Université de Stanford, où il travailla comme professeur, le psychologue canadien Albert Bandura, mena une expérience pour démontrer que certains comportements sont enseignés par les enfants par l'observation et l'imitation.

Synthétiquement, l’expérience avait comme variables indépendantes un "agresseur" et une bulle gonflable (un jouet à la mode des années soixante). Le ballon, de la taille d'un enfant de 6 à 8 ans, avait une forme en œuf d'un poids inférieur, de sorte qu'il retrouvait sa forme d'origine. Le ballon avec un visage de clown sympathique était „Bobo Doll".

Le groupe expérimental était composé d'enfants du personnel et des étudiants de la maternelle de l'Université Stanford. Selon la méthodologie classique, ils ont été divisés en groupes expérimentaux et en groupes témoins.

L'expérience a été réalisée en trois phases:

a) Le groupe expérimental a été placé dans une pièce où il a été témoin de „l'agression" d'une jeune femme sur la ,,Bobo Doll": elle lui a donné un coup de main, de pied, avec un petit marteau, s'est assise sur elle, cria des mots insultants ("sucer!", etc). Donc, le groupe expérimental a été témoin d'une scène d'agressivité physique et verbale.

b) Ensuite, le groupe d'enfants ayant vu la scène a été autorisé à jouer dans la pièce où se trouvaient encore la poupée et les petits marteaux. Après, l'autre groupe - le groupe de contrôle, qui n'avait pas assisté à l'expérience - a été amené dans la même pièce avec les mêmes objets et le même temps pour le jeux libre.

c) Il y avait une différence significative dans le "jeu" du groupe expérimental avec „Bobo Doll" par rapport au comportement du groupe témoin. Le premier a imité l'agressivité verbale et physique observée.

En conclusion:

a) Les enfants qui observent le comportement agressif d'un adulte, lorsqu'ils en ont l'occasion sont plus susceptibles de faire preuve d'agressivité que ceux qui ne sont pas exposés à l'agression.

b) L'apprentissage se fait non seulement par renforcement (punition ou récompense) selon les théories de Pavlov et de Skinner, mais aussi par observation et imitation, en l'absence de punition ou de récompense.

Dans une expérience-réplique réalisée en 1963, Bandura a remplacé la scène en direct de l'agression de ,,Bobo Doll" par une vidéo.

Les résultats ont confirmé ceux de la première expérience.

En conclusion: l'exposition indirecte à l' agressivité - à travers les médias - conduit à des comportements agressifs.

Bandura, Ross et Ross (1963) ont tenté de déterminer si le renforcement utilisé par le behavioriste Skinner pour encourager ou décourager certains comportements pouvait influencer le comportement d'un observateur qui assiste - en tant que tiers - à récompenser ou punir les autres pour agressivité.

Dans le design de l'expérience initiale, une troisième personne a été introduit :

a) devant un groupe d'observateurs, a donné une récompense alimentaire à l'agresseur;
b) devant un autre groupe d'observateurs, elle a critiqué l'agresseur.

En conclusion, les enfants qui ont visionnés la vidéo avec la récompense de l'agresseur étaient plus susceptibles de l'imiter (Bandura 1977, 120-140).

Comme tous les expérience psychologique, l'expérience de Bandura a été critiqué comme:

(a) Sélection subjective de l'échantillon (exclusivement des enfants de familles dont le niveau d'éducation est supérieur à la moyenne);
(b) Faible validité externe (parce que les participants aux expériences ont l'âge de la maternelle, un intervalle étroit qui ne permet pas d'extrapoler les résultats aux âges où l'imitation des adultes joue un rôle moins important);
(c) Ethique de la méthodologie utilisée (la prévisibilité de l'imitation du comportement adulte de l'échantillon à l'âge de la première enfance - 0 à 7 ans).

En 1977, à partir de ces recherches, Bandura a élaboré la théorie de l'apprentissage social, un bagage „utile" de la psychosociologie, en particulier dans l'étude de l'agressivité. Selon lui, il existe un lien direct entre élever un enfant dans un environnement agressif et son comportement d'adulte violent. Il postule que l'apprentissage social est la base de la socialisation. Le développement de la personnalité humaine se produit par l'observation et l'imitation, des modèles issus de l'environnement social. Mais la socialisation est un processus qui dure toute la vie. En raison de l'apprentissage social, les enfants apprennent à marcher, en raison de l'apprentissage social, ils apprennent à parler, etc.

2. Paradoxes de la socialisation des nouvelles générations

De telles théories ont conduit à des changements majeurs dans les pratiques et la législation en matière d’éducation des enfants. Dans de nombreux pays, il est interdit d’agresser les enfants, pas seulement dans les établissements d’enseignement, mais également dans la famille.

La législation roumaine interdit „tout acte de violence (...) tant dans la famille que dans les institutions assurant la protection, le soin et l'éducation des enfants, dans les unités sanitaires, les unités éducatives ainsi que dans toute autre institution publique ou fournisseur privé de services ou d'activités avec des enfants”.[2]

En ce qui concerne les théories de l'apprentissage social de l'agressivité, le développement de nouvelles technologies de communication et l'accès des enfants à un contenu agressif, les réglementations législatives sont paradoxales.

Une brève intrusion dans l'histoire de la télévision roumaine au cours des dernières décennies, par exemple, révèle les grands changements survenus dans le quotidien des trois dernières générations. En Roumanie, la télévision est apparue à la fin de 1956. Une réalité dans la vie de la majorité des citoyens elle n’est pas devenue que dans les années 70. Cependant, en 1980-90, la Roumanie a connu une grave crise pendant laquelle le programme télé a été réduit à deux heures par jour, les contenus de ses émissions étant trop politisés et politisés,

Le premier grand changement dans le quotidien, dû à la chute du régime communiste en décembre 1989, a été la liberté et l'explosion de la presse écrite et de l’audiovisuel.

Les nouvelles réalités politiques ont coïncidé avec l'émergence et l'accès aux nouvelles technologies de communication (ordinateur, internet, smartphone). À l'heure actuelle, est rare l'absence d'une appareil de télévision à domicile, d'un smartphone et d'un ordinateur de l'élève du secondaire. La presse écrite est également lue en ligne. L'abonnement le moins cher au réseau de télévision par câble fournit plus de cent stations de télévision.

En ce qui concerne les chaines roumaines, la chaine nationale (La Télévision Roumaine – TVR) diffuse quotidiennement sur 3 programmes, plus les studios territoriaux. 14 autres chaines commerciales nationales émettent 24 heures sur 24. Il existe également des chaines de cultes religieux et trois chaines nationales qui diffusent exclusivement musique folklorique roumaine.

Selon le concept de „société ouverte" de Karl Popper (Popper 1979) et les théories de la démocratisation à l'horizontale, par l'initiative et la participation des citoyennes, les chaînes de télévision locales étaient considérées comme un bon coagulant pour „l'âme de la communauté”.

Ainsi, au moins une station de télévision locale a été créée dans chaque ville, capitale du comté (environ 50 stations locales en Roumanie). Elles diffusent des informations quotidiennes, des reportages, des interviews, des talk-shows et divertissements.

En Roumanie, il existe une *Loi sur l'audiovisuel* et une institution nommée Conseil national de l'audiovisuel qui veille à son respect. Mais le contenu de la loi régit les mécanismes économiques du marché des médias. Un seul article fait référence aux contenus des médias dans les termes suivants: „Art. 3, p. 2.Tous les fournisseurs de services de médias audiovisuels ont l'obligation de fournir des informations objectives au public afin de permettre une présentation correcte des faits et d es événements et de favoriser la libre opinion des citoyens”.[3]

Dans le cas de contenus à forte agressivité ou nudité, les avertissements sur sont les suivants: "Nous vous avertissons qu'ils suivent des images à impact émotionnel" ; ou „Il est interdit aux mineurs de moins de 12 (15) ans sans leur consentement ou en présence de leurs parents”.

3. La méthodologie de la recherche

Nous proposons ci-après l'estimation de certaines données d'une étude sur le contenu médiatique agressif d'une journée habituelle (mercredi 8 novembre 2018) aux niveaux national et local (Roumanie, respectivement la ville d’Arad).[4]

La méthode d'analyse du contenu du discours réside dans le traitement quantitatif d'un matériau symbolique qualitatif. La méthode est principalement appréciée pour son potentiel dans l'analyse objective et systématique de la communication en calculant la fréquence des indicateurs quantifiables. Laurence

Bardin la définit comme „une herméneutique fondée et contrôlée par la déduction par inférence" (Bardin 1993, 28).

Comme toute méthode, elle présente des avantages et des inconvénients. Son principal mérite est son utilisation dans l'analyse de documents contenant des informations complexes ayant une grande valeur communicative: messages aux médias, statistiques officielles, rapports, documents d'enquête judiciaire, lois et décrets, etc. Parmi les limites de la méthode, il y a la difficulté d'établir les catégories et les indicateurs, les tests et les corrections dans la découpe du matériau à soumettre à l'analyse du contenu.

Pour la contextualisation, nous énumérons certaines des traits des programmes de la télévision roumaine:

a) Comme l'avait dit Pierre Bourdieu (1996), les médias ont la tendance à ne pas informer, mais à émotionner (Bourdieu 1996). Malheureusement, l’appel aux affects est généralement réduit aux négatives.

b) Les principales informations des chaînes de télévision nationales commerciales commencent généralement par un „cas choquant" illustrant des comportements agressifs à l'extrême. En règle générale, les auteurs de tels actes ont de graves troubles psychiatriques. Cependant, les commentaires des journalistes sont inappropriés à cette réalité, avec les plus grands effets rhétoriques dans le schéma de crimes d'amour, de jalousie, de trahison, etc.

c) Dans la concurrence féroce entre les chaînes commerciales, l'accent est mis sur le négatif de la société: scandales, crimes, pillages, etc. Le journal télévisé est donc un recueil d’événements sur lesquels les services d’inspection de comté et de police enquêtent, fournissant une image globale de l’insécurité et de la multitude d’infractions et de délinquants, très déformés par rapport à la réalité.

d) Mêmes les phénomènes météorologiques habituels du climat roumain - neige, tempêtes, chaleur - sont traités sous le signe de l'apocalypse.

e) La presse nationale et la presse locale regorgent de stéréotypes tels que: scandale gigantesque, impact dévastateur, accident spectaculaire, information choquante, main pénale, race folle, images révoltantes, situation scandaleuse, etc.

f) Dépassé par l'audience des chaînes commerciales, la chaîne de télévision nationale devient de plus en plus concessive au style agressif de sélection et de présentation des informations.

Dans ce contexte, pour l'analyse du contenu des médias locaux, nous avons utilisé comme terme de comparaison l'une des émissions d'information les plus visionnées en Roumanie, *l'Observatoire*, de l'heure 19, de la chaîne de télévision nationale Antena 1.

***L'Observatoire* du 8 novembre 2018** contenait 21 matériaux filmés (Figure 1), la plus grande partie ayant des thèmes sociaux (9). Il y avait à une distance significative des nouvelles des domaines de la culture, de l'éducation, de la religion (3), de la politique (3), de la santé (3), des loisirs, des curiosités (3) et d'autres (météo 1).



Figure 1. La structure de *L'Observatoire,* Antena 1.

Sur 9 nouvelles à contenu social, 8 étaient agressifs. Ils ont été cités sur une échelle de 0 à 5 (nous reproduisons leur titre pour une représentation plus claire de l'ensemble des faits): +5 („Une femme tuée dans l'accident par un prêtre qui a bu de l'alcool") ; +4 („Scandale dans l'hôpital - garde blessée"; „Il a écrit ses intentions criminelles sur papier") ; +3 („Fausse menace", „Né plus tôt, transfert tardif", „Un chauffeur en fuite à la recherche de flics"); +2 („Accident spectaculaire, pilote chanceux", „Feu en bloc d'une bougie").

En outre, deux des trois nouvelles en politique ont un contenu agressif, répertorié comme suit: +3 („Scènes obscènes en séance plénière du Parlement”) ; +2 („Le président et le premier ministre face à face”).

Il en résulte que 47% du contenus contiennent un degré d'agressivité élevé (Figure 2).

Avec cette unité de référence, nous avons allé à l'analyse de la presse locale d'Arad (Roumanie) comme suit:



Figure 2. Contenus agressifs /non-agressifs

a)TV Arad- station de télévision locale qui présente en priorité les événements de la journée a 19 heures.

Dans ses 18 nouvelle (Figure 3), ne prévalent plus les informations dans le domaine social (4), mais la politique (6) et de la culture, de l'éducation, de la religion (5), de la santé (1), de l'économie (1), des autres (1).

Mais il y a un article négatif (une femme tuée par un train), mais nous ne pouvons pas parler d'agression, car l'événement tragique n'a pas été délibérément provoqué.



Figure 3. La structure des Nouvelles de TV ARAD

b) Le Journal d'Arad, le journal quotidien local le plus ancien et le plus populaire, qui paraît imprimé et en ligne.

L'édition en ligne présente 31 articles dont le contenu couvre les domaines suivants: social (8), culture, éducation, religion (7), politique (5), sport (4) et divertissement, curiosités (7). (Figure 4).



Figure 4. La structure de *Le Journal d'Arad*

Les contenus agressifs se manifestent (Figure 5) dans les articles de social (5), politique (2), divertissement, curiosité (1).



Figure 5. Contenus agressifs /non-agressifs dans *Le Journal d'Arad*

c) Aradon-quotidien local en ligne

Il a publié 30 articles dans les domaines suivants: social (14), culture, éducation, religion (4), politique (6), sport (3), divertissement, curiosité (3) (Figure 6).

Ceux-ci comprennent des contenus agressifs (Figure 7): sociaux (6), politiques (2), sportifs (1), divertissements, curiosité (1).

Les nouvelles chargées avec agressivité étaient les suivantes: „Un élève a été battu dans la rue par deux autres personnes, personne n'est intervenu"; „Une femme décédée après avoir été battue par un ivrogne"; „Le fournisseur de chaleur de la ville ferme ses portes le 16 novembre" (menace).

Il est à noter que deux articles ont été publiés dans ce numéro qui évoquent des comportements pro-sociaux („Des policiers à Arad - des donneurs de sanget" ; „Un homme a trouvé 95 000 euros dans une armoire achetée et l'ont restituée à vendeur").



Figure 6. La structure d'*Aradon*

4. L'analyse des commentaires de la presse locale en ligne pendant 3 jours



Figure 7. Contenus agressifs/non-agressifs d'Aradon

L'explosion des nouvelles technologies de communication a généré un phénomène très dangereux - l'agression sur internet ou le cyberbullying (Keith et Martin 2005, 224-228). Bien que ceci soit défini comme du harcèlement interpersonnel via l'internet ou le téléphone mobile, nous apprécions le fait que l'analyse des commentaires sur les articles de la presse en ligne révèle un degré élevé d'agressivité. Sous l'anonymat du son „nom de guerre", le commentateur écrit des remarques offensantes et agressives à l'auteur de l'article, à la personne interviewée ou à une partie du public. Même si les gens se protègent en les ignorant, l'espace public virtuel induit la perception d'un monde où tout est possible, où la haine et l'agressivité se répandent sans être frappées, ni punies.

Sur les 51 articles de la presse en ligne analysés, 36 ont été commentés (Figure 8).

L'article le plus commenté était „Le maire de la ville dans la course pour Le parlement européen” (Figure 9) avec 54 commentaires (85% agressif).

Comment se fait-il qu'un article sur l'intention d'un politicien local de se présenter à un poste au Parlement européen soit si cumulatif et si activement négatif? Nous traitons ici d'un autre phénomène généré par la communication virtuelle: les groupes d'intérêt désignés en Roumanie par le terme „postaci" (du verbe „poster"). Il s’agit en général de groupes organisés et parrainés par des partis ou par certains hommes politiques, agissant sur ordre de ceux-ci, soit : a. pour fabriquer du prestige (in group); b. soit



Figure 8. Les commentaires de la presse locale en ligne pendant 3 jours.



Figure 9. Les commentaires agressifs/non-agressifs du le plus commenté article.

pour dénigrer et harceler la concurrence de l’espace public et politique.

Cela s'explique également par le nombre important de commentaires polarisés dans les articles du „CET qui cessent de fonctionner le 16 novembre” (29 commentaires, dont 70% agressifs), ainsi que par les explications du maire sur la question de l'approvisionnement en énergie thermique (14 commentaires, 78 % agressif). Nous mentionnons que le CET est l’abréviation du fournisseur de chaleur pour les habitants d’Arad (Figure 10).



Figure 10. Les commentaires agressifs/non-agressifs pour „CET qui cessent de fonctionner…”

Un autre article dans le domaine social ("Parking pour les voitures devant le centre commercial”*)* a suscité 26 commentaires (dont 68% agressifs) - (Figure 11).



Figure 11. Les commentaires agressifs/non-agressifs pour „Parking pour les voitures devant le centre commercial…”

Globalement, de notre recherche aboutissent les conclusions suivantes:

1. Il y a moins d'agression dans les médias locaux que dans les médias nationales. Cela peut s'expliquer par le nombre moins élevé de „faits de sensation ", mais aussi par le degré élevé de cohésion et les interactions directes des citoyens

des petites villes;

2. La presse locale est une presse d'événements culturels, sportifs et politiques dans la vie de la communauté et de certaines caractéristiques de groupes distincts (vacances scolaires et olympiades, événements d'ONG pour personnes âgées, personnes handicapées etc);
3. L'évolution de médias, tant en termes de sélection des faits que de style de traitement, est plus qu'inquiétante; Le développement dans le même sens représente un grave danger pour la démocratie et pour la nécessité de garantir la sécurité de l'être humain.

5. Quelques observations psychosociologiques

Avec l'explosion des médias et de la communication dans l'espace virtuel, la recherche sur les effets des comportements agressifs s'est principalement concentrée sur les enfants et les jeunes. Bien que la relation entre l'influence sociale de la violence et le comportement agressif présenté par les médias (télévision) se soit révélée très difficile à étudier dans des conditions de laboratoire; et la situation pratique s'avère impossible avec la quantification. Cependant, il existe de nombreux témoignages d'agresseurs qui affirment avoir appliqué les leçons qu'ils ont apprises en regardant des émissions de télévision.

Dans la phase classique de ces recherches, Geen et Donnerstein (1998) ont passé en revue plusieurs études sur la thème et sont parvenues aux conclusions suivantes (parfois contradictoires):

1. La violence à la télévision vécue par les participants à l'expérience est souvent de moyenne et courte durée; Au lieu de cela, la violence à laquelle les téléspectateurs sont exposés est plus étendue et beaucoup moins grave. Les recherches ont estimé que dans les films d'animation pour enfants, un acte violent était signalé toutes les deux minutes. Jusqu'à 16 ans, un enfant sera témoin de plus de 13 000 crimes présentés à la télévision.
2. La violence et l'agressivité sont souvent présentées comme ne causant pas de dommages aux victimes (les souffrances et les blessures sont sous-estimées); Dans de nombreux cas, l'agresseur est présenté comme un per-

sonnage positif et sympathique; on dit rarement qu'il a été puni pour la violence qu'il a commise. Dans de nombreux cas, l'agresseur est présenté comme un personnage positif et sympathique. Nous disons rarement qu'il a été puni pour la violence qu'il a commise.

Des études de laboratoire récentes sur le sujet ont montré que (Betea 2015):

1. Ce n'est que lorsque le film justifie la violence qu'il affiche qu'il peut donner lieu à un comportement agressif.
2. L'exposition à la violence à la télévision ne conduit à l'agression que lorsque, initialement, il existe un niveau d'agressivité;
3. La relation entre la violence à la télévision et l'agression n'est valable que dans la mesure où le spectateur s'identifie à l'agresseur du film;
4. Lorsque l'agresseur est présenté comme „libérateur”, l'agressivité est plus susceptible de se produire ;
5. Les personnes qui constatent une violence accrue deviennent moins préoccupées par les conséquences néfastes de leurs actes.

Ce sont des expériences, des recherches et des théories spécialisées qui diffusent difficiles ou pas du tout dans l’espace public. Plus efficaces seraient les messages envoyés par les mêmes canaux et au même niveau d'accessibilité pour les consommateurs de médias. Voici, par exemple, un véritable code de comportement en ligne pour enfants, composé de 10 règles, du site norvégien Barnevakten.no:[5]

Zone sans agression:[6]

1. Soyez honnête et poli;
2. Pensez à ce que vous écrivez ;
3. Respecter les personnes d'une autre ethnie ou race et de ceux qui ont un autre mode de vie;
4. Respectez la loi de votre pays et la loi du pays du correspondant;
5. Respecter les droits d'auteur, qu'il s'agisse de texte, d'images, de sons ou de logiciels;
6. N'envoyez pas de matériel pornographique à contenu violent, raciste ou blasphématoire;

7. Respectez les autres utilisateurs ;
8. Soyez intelligent en dépensant de l'argent en ligne;
9. Signalez les illégalités que vous constatez ;
10. N'oubliez pas que d'autres enfants utilisent également des forums.

Nous soutenons également que la liberté de la presse dans l'environnement virtuel doit être synchronisée avec celle de la liberté dans le monde réel: vous êtes libre de dire ou de faire que vous voulez tant que vous n'interférez pas avec les droits des autres.

Notes

1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmBqwWlJg8U

2. http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/legea_protectiei_copilului.php

3. http://www.cna.ro/Legea-nr-504-din-11-iulie-2002.html

4. L'analyse du contenu a été réalisée avec la contribution d'étudiants de première année du master CEP de la Faculté de Sciences de l'Education, Psychologie et Assistance sociale, Université "Aurel Vlaicu" d'Arad, au cours *Le management de la communication* (prof. Lavinia Betea), sem. 1, l'année univ. 2018-2019.

5. http://www.barnevakten.no/

6. https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agresiunea_pe_Internet

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The colors of Cosmopolis

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Abstract: How are the fact of blackness, or the Global South's claimed or deconstructed marginality, or the color-blind discourse seen in the key of perceptions on the cosmopolitanism, as suggested by Appiah? A series of post-colonial authors focused on the knowledge production or the fact of blackness as having given a new impetus to the discourse on the deconstruction of the Moral Self, in the last decades.

Harnessing the fact of blackness as counter-argument for the marginality, while considering the actual effects of color-blind discourse on the definition of the Self, the debate proposed is focused on the elements that blackness, marginality and cosmopolitanism have in common, from a philosophical and also very pragmatic political perspective.

Through this analysis, the aim is to argue on the importance, if any, of colors and on their possible meanings outside the visual arts, in the *cosmopolis,* namely the world of debates and relations, The qualitative approach of some relevant discourses is preferred and the methodology is the holistic critical view over writings of key thinkers that influenced the "coming out of Africa" from the marginality it was condemned to, as a symbol of Global South's deconstruction.

The recall to a debate based on the fact of blackness, the marginality and color-blindness, even if done in the interpretative lens of an European observer, is an attempt to define new paths towards the re-ordering of colored discourses on the Self and its beyond.

Keywords: colors, Self, Other, difference, cosmopolis.

1. Introduction

This paper is a result of a multidirectional analysis of the global change perspectives and cosmopolitanism in the post-colonialist discourse. These changes were valued under the lens of the *development* cliché, the term being considered western or Eurocentric (Sachs 1992; Esteva 1992; Crush 1995; Cowen & Shenton 1996; Pieterse 1998; Pieterse 2010), even though the approach would like to bring forth African standpoints on the subject. It is the purpose of this paper to support the views contributing to the deconstruction of some discourses around cosmopolitanism, from the point of view of African development studies and philosophy.

Therefore, the principal aim of the qualitative analysis herein is suggested by the development studies, as a point of departure to a pragmatic view on cosmopolitanism, allowing the questioning of it from perspectives of postcolonial politics, discourse and practice, in outward division of views and assumptions (Creswell 2009, 11). This direction was encouraged by the fact that development means more than a status, seemingly fixed in concept throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War history of thought, with reference to its opposition, namely the underdevelopment that created it (Rodney 1973; Rapley 2007; Pieterse 2010). It also refers to the movement or the progress of a natural process. In this process alternative destructions and renewals are constantly possible (Cowen & Shenton 1996), encompassing several facets of the Self's becoming in a circular ever return to it, as suggested by Derrida in his reading of Robinson Crusoe's invention of the wheel (Naas 2015, 99-100).

The actions of talking about and analyzing the cosmopolitanism in this manner might, themselves, have a base in the need to maintain, due to practical needs, a certain critical reading of development, so as to actually keep it alive despite its deconstructions.

From the first readings of development, early in the eighteenth century, the integration of „history with cosmopolitan intent" in the official or less official doctrines of development has been sustained. This would have started with Kant's essay of 1784, „Idea for a universal history with cosmopolitan intent" (Cowen &Shenton 1996, x). Actively three centuries later[1], following a Derridean deconstructivist suggestion of reversing structure's hierarchies (Vitale 2018, 31), it would be relevant to debate on „cosmopolis with historical intent". It means accepting there are limitations to the european's view on the history, meanwhile the *cosmopolis*, seen as a cosmopolitan system of thought might have gained the possibility to continually re-read and re-write its development history, supported by a „new tribe" of cosmopolitan intellectuals (Crush 1995, 54).

As a consequence, besides considering the specific structuralist[2] hierarchies inside this „tribe", whose contours were traced in the postcolonial discourse (Wa Thiong' O 1981), talking about cosmopolitanism from the position of the development thinker would mean putting emphasize on a sort of perception of perceptions. With this opportunity and also research goal, the present is an altenative, combined, approach to differences of universality, in the conceptualization repository of Appiah (2005a).

Taking inspiration from Appiah's idea on cosmopolitanism, whose functioning is based on the communication between people who do not have to share the same culture, because they are different and welcome their difference (Appiah 2005, 258), the suggestion would be to consider this type of difference subsumed to a hypothetical category of color, rejecting any possible reference to the mere color of the skin.

The development studies seem to have not included, in a sufficient manner yet, the significance of colors in the discourse of Self's becoming, in the *cosmopolis*. If there was a reference to diversity, it did not emphasize color in the chromatics of its meaning, but rather continued and accentuated the *black and white* color marginal classical binaries, signified by the interaction between image and power on a global scale (Pieterse 1992, 235). However, there was a relevance and a first critical look on the issue of cosmopolitanism made by postcolonial writers concentrating on the Western thought's effects on the perceptions that the colonial westerners had on the objectified colonized, nevertheless on concepts like but not limited to skin color, geographic determinism, the inferiority of other races, the birth of development after the underdevelopment as named by president Truman (Sachs 1992, 4) and the perspectives of Global South's so-called development.

Focusing on Appiah’s work and not only, herein the blackness-whiteness construction’s deconstruction analysis is assumed, by allowing the emergence of a new concept of *cosmopolis*’s colors, from which to identify the *fact of color*, by questioning what blackness (as fact, essence or reaction), marginality (as centeredness or periphery-ness) and cosmopolitanism could have in common. To define the proposed concept, direct connections between the colors (or differences) and development, or change-progress, should be clearly defined.

Finally, the present reflection constitutes a small glossary of deconstruction conclusions as notes to a more ample grounded theory on the facts of the reality and the communication of identity, in a contextual universal difference, such as the cosmopolitanism.

The ideas in this paper were introduced at the *Cosmopolitanism and World Citizenship International Conference*, organized online, by London Interdisciplinary Research Institute, University of Birbeck, on May, the 16th 2020, and the promise was to deepen ideas of Kwame Anthony Appiah on the purpose.

2. Naming the fact of color. Space, Subject and Process

The metaphor of color is the expression of a difference between individuals, groups, cultures, societies, from a socio-humanistic perspective. This difference does not referred to nuances, and is thus not meant to simply re-assert the uniqueness of the individual, of the group, culture and society, as this is not the scope. It is referred to actual different positions in the spectrum of light (or knowledge), positions that are floating, flexible and temporary, notifying the opposites, complementary or combined representations of the Self.

The representations of the Self would refer to images rather than the perception of one subject on the own Self. It is agreed that any subject might produce a discourse that gives birth to the other, transferring the subject on a different position, as in the case of an aquarelle displaced on a color palette, that could touch and get mixed with another aquarelle, naturally (as a consequence of events) or by force of external intervention. In the narrative of colors on the palette, the most evident and simple example would be the representation related to the affiliation to one nation, nationalism being the classical, logical opposition to cosmopolitanism.

Any process meant to exalt the Self under the form of nationalism would diminish cosmopolitanism, by extension of an Etienne Balibar's theory (Mohanram & Rajan 1995, 172). From an African philosophical perspective, this nationalism-cosmopolitanism relation is one of false hierarchy, due to equal project dimensions acting beyond the selves and the families, but also due to equal questioning in reference to the global or the local issue, or participatory debates they caused (Appiah 2005, 239). Besides, the falsity of this hierarchy is revealed by the colonial struggle aiming to bring together nationalism with cosmopolitanism (Masolo 2004, 496). In an African context, the idea of nationalism would question the centeredness or periphery-ness of the Self, since it means self-discovery (Lumumba-Kasongo 1999, 95). The Self in issue does not only refer to a physical person in the society and the way he/she defines himself/herself in relation to others by naming his/her national membership, but also as group or culture whose *raison d' être* is to create and give reaction to a particular set of needs that are, or should become common to those whose membership was acclaimed.

The definition of the marginal character of a subject would go beyond its linguistic meaning. It would represent the tendency of inclusion in a superior category and as a consequence, the opportunity to occupy a central ontological position in this other category, whether at the center or at the periphery of it. This metaphor is symbolized by Ernest Gellner's romantic view on the map of the world before nationalism, imagined as a painting of Kokoshka, where there is no clear pattern in detail, though there is for a whole picture (Gellner 1983, 139). In this view, the points that can't give pattern to the details are the subjects, having a central ontological position on the map due to the importance of each detail they create for the whole, but being situated wherever, at the center or at the periphery of this whole.Thus marginality, the representation of the mentioned marginal character of a subject, requires the interpretation of space, whether space is considered the locus of an individual's self-defining, a locus of a group's identification occupying a limited area, virtually or not a locus of a nation-state having an established territory, or even that one of a group of states allowing for regional power-knowledge symbolic influences to come into being and challenge the inner and exterior equilibriums of other similar groups (e.g. the BRICS[3] vs. the floating and an ever differently sized group of greatest and most developed western-type economies[4]).

With regard to the same interdependency details have with the whole and while expressing the marginal character of a subject, besides the positioning at the center or at the periphery of the world, as important significant for cosmopolitanism, Derrida suggested that, considering Kant's conceptualization of cosmopolitanism based on universal hospitality (Derrida 2005, 19), there are many Selves and Others gathering in a virtual space of exchange on hospitality, each one having to consider being a host and a guest at some time.

In the construction of the present discourse, being a host or a guest is a matter of *fact of difference*, pictorially imagined like a *fact of color*. This presumes already a kind of difference given by a contiguous (physical or virtual) unity of marginality, due to which Appiah goes on and reconsiders the fact of sharing the world as Strangers, with Strangers (Appiah 2006). Returning to Gellner's artistic imagination of the world before nationalism and the concept of cosmopolitanism from a realistic international relations point of view, the map of the world would necessarily represent a big painting of states with the same function (to construct the world), but different capabilities (given by blurred details and their position on the whole), as in the waltzian structuralism (Donnelly 2005, 35).

Whether it is about subjects as individuals, states or groups, at this first level of discourse, colors of the cosmopolis are manifestations of a tendency to marginality, seen as sharing (or functioning) and capability, in reference to positions held or occupied in a certain space of final higher definition of the subject, i.e. the Self. Such positions held or occupied are a matter of complex combinations, taking into account the collective identity's proclivity to „go imperial", dominating people of other identities as well as other Identities, with their formula of shaping individuality and distinctiveness (Appiah 1994, 134).

In analyzing a formula of individuality and distinctiveness shaping, the relations between the core and the periphery are controlled by the perception the periphery has, that the core would necessarily dominate (Burchill 2005, 62). This was inspired by the history of the neo-colonial rule, during which "identity" and "differentiation" are represented in the relations between Africans and Europeans, with "identity" signifying the similarity of social and political institutions, but "differentiation", their specificity or adaptability to the context (Mandami 1996, 7). Hence, there is a thick border line between viewing cosmopolitanism as signifying the marginal character of a subject dependent to positioning on an ontological map and the nature of sharing of identity and the capability to differentiation it presumes. According to Appiah, variety is not something to value no matter what (Appiah 2005, 268).

Using the metaphor of combination, colors are imagined as subjects in mobility, in hybridization, in evolutionary adaptation and bearing thinkable returns, as in the metaphor of Robinson's Crusoe wheel, which was in the attention of Derrida. Hence, the *fact of color* is only a fact, i.e. an act of phenomenological essence or a fact of spacial, or rather virtual membership, whether the membership was chosen by the individual or not. Because it might be true that "*The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident*" (Nussbaum 2019, 75), but in the case of nations, cultures, groups, the individual has the possibility to decide the creation or integration in them and nationalism is not accidental (Gellner 1983, 56). On a second level of the discourse, marginality, as the spacial parameter, is overlooked in order to give voice to the facts of identity, or subjectivity. The identity vectors cosmopolitanism, in a new conceptualization as deconstruction and juxtaposition of opposites, assuming the rejection of non-colors, on which Franz Fanon gave us a hint, back in the fifties (Fanon, 1952/2008, 6):

> I believe that the fact of the juxtaposition of the white and black races has created a massive psycho existential complex. I hope by analyzing it to destroy it.

Thinking of the color combination metaphor and Appiah's "go imperial" of the identities, nonetheless to the existential complex revealed by the juxtaposition of the white and black races assumed by Fanon, with regard to the colonial past and the postcolonial revival of its discourse, the metaphor of color in the *cosmopolis* bears a deconstruction on its own essence. This happens because of the two elements of the identity: the recognition and the imposition, between which Appiah could not find any bright-line (Appiah 2005, 110).

Actually, Fanon (1952), reminding Hegel's paradigm on the recognition of the selves as mutually recognizing each other (Fanon 2008, 169), had tried to assess the fact of a non-universal subjectivity, based on the contradictions and actions it implied. Facts are actions or movements of not only the Self, but also the Other and there is no possibility to dismiss the reality of imposition between the first on the latter, no matter the role the Self or the Other were playing in the hospitality's bias of cosmopolitanism, as hosts and guests.

A central point of this issue of roles, transposed into cosmopolitan attitude, would be the very odd distinction between the Other and the Stranger, from a more general category of the Other. The notion of the "stranger" is imperative for the cosmopolitanism of Appiah, that is founded on the moral status of political strangers (Appiah 2005, 219). On this distinction between the Other and the Stranger hovers the doubts of Derrida when talking about *hostipitality* as inference to *hospitality*, which would be the right the strangers have to enjoy hospitality wherever they go (Derrida 2000; Critchley & Kearney 2005, xii). Such inference would be articulated by the common linguistic family of the terms *hospitality* and *hostility.*

For Derrida (1995) hospitality is not just an ethic, but the culture itself (Derrida 2005, 16). Subjects are taught to give hospitality or not. In the cosmopolitan paradigm of Appiah, however, giving hospitality in a home of everywhere or anywhere shows the cynical hostility of an invitation to a home that does not exist, practically (Appiah 2005, 218). According to Kant the right to be welcomed with hospitality was even more neatly subsumed to the right of the stranger not to be treated with hostility (Derrida 2000, 21). However, in self-identification discourses, like the discourse of blackness, or his predecessor, the Négritude, the fact of being an Other and not simply a Stranger meant the probability of the Other to benefit from hospitality with hostility from the culture it was assimilated in.

As a consequence of this subjectivity of the Other and the necessary *hostipitality*, whose meaning should hereby be enlarged, the partial cosmopolitanism of Appiah founded on the decision of defending humanity or, on the contrary, the nationalistic rejection of strangers (Lenz & Dallmann 2005a, 7), is completed by the idea of W.E.B. Du Bois on cosmopolitanism, as very close to freedom in the conceptualization of Mill (Appiah 2005a, 39). Observing in Mill's freedom an important issue for Du Bois, namely the idea that for different persons, different conditions of spiritual development are necessary (Appiah 2005a, 40), allows Appiah to value the contribution of Du Bois to the cosmopolitan thinking. The latter supported the *cosmopolitan nationalism*, by being culturally, methodologically and ethically oriented to assert single subjectivity, and in the context of his perspectives, that one of the Negro, or the Idea of Negro (Appiah 2005a, 26). Nevertheless, the assertion of “the Negro” was made in relation to a world of colors that were not denied, rather observed, analyzed, taken as place of recognition, with the purpose to dodge imposition from it.

From a Western geo-political point of view, the observations and analysis of human variety gave birth to the creation of race, nations and ethnic groups as set of “peoples” (individualities) who became subjects to justified material and political inequalities (Flint & Taylor 2018, 41). Achille Mbembé highlights that race is a consequence of loss, separation, extermination (Mbembé 2017, 34), so a domination of identity, with the form of shaping individuality and distinctiveness, this time valued in a positive manner.In fact, Du Bois was positive for the “preservation of races” (Foner 1970, 79), and considered “the Negro” a seventh son, after the Egyptian, the Indian, the Greek, the Roman, the Teutonian and Mongolian (Appiah 2005a, 23), meanwhile sharing the “pan”- wise view.

Returning to Fanon's non–universalism and cosmopolitanism, characterized as “neoliberal confusion” (Bernasconi 2011, 90), Fanon seems to be more ontologically historical when questioning the universalism through the emergence of the subject from oppositions. Renouncing to one's blackness (an emergence of subjectivity, before all) means for him becoming white (Fanon 2008(1952), 9), which would show that evolution has a particular direction, from black to white (Sardar 2008, xiii). Thus, it seems Fanon emphasised the privilege of a primordial black, as an act of recognition, up to imagining that gaining a whiter status means evolution, but also an imposition. Nonetheless, this would allow for the idea of in-between-ers.

The line between recognition and imposition was seen by Fanon, but not by Appiah. Moreover, considering Fanon's acts of rationalization of the white and black world, with no in-between prospect (although in-between-ers), since "an Anti-Semite is inevitably an anti-Negro" (Fanon 1952 (2008), 92), shows that the contextualized facts of subjectivity (as the emergence of the subject, taking him out of the marginality, the re-positioning of it, the objectification of it in a postcolonial reading) are to be seen as facts of color in a cosmopolitan perspective, in order to deconstruct the false horizons Pieterse referred to in his book: "White on black. Images of Africa and Blacks in Western Popular Culture" (1992).

The idea of *facts of subjectivity* would finally imply the definition of a socialization process able to create the referred identities/subjectivities (Habermas 1994, 113), but without making them able to take part of any world ranking, despite the systemic suggestion on this (Wallerstein 2004, 39). Naturally different like objects of consciousness (as well as recognition), the facts of subjectivity may be conceptualized as facts of color, departing from the model of a fact of blackness, that, in its original form, should have had no conscious racial grounds (Mbembé 2017, 42). But, despite the impositional character of the socialization, between persuasive and persuaded subjects who felt and lived „inbred racial guilt", subsumed to the fact of blackness as described in Fanon's „Black Skin, White Masks" (Caute 1970, 5), the differentiation and consciousness contained the recognition proposal. The same as in the Négritude movement, which inspired the concept of the fact of blackness.

Inevitably continuous, the socialization process reflects the history of on-going creative processes of self-identification, whose subject, the individual, was objectified. Hence, the most social thing is precisely the cultivation of individuality, according to interpretations of Mill (Appiah 2005, 211). Cosmopolitanism would be an ideal in the West (Appiah 2005, 218), but also an argument that the world is shaped by racism and moving beyond the racism would mean moving beyond current racial identities (Appiah 1994, 55).

Therefore it could be concluded that, the coming out of the objectification which was possible also due to racist gaze (as in the discourse of blackness), as actual discourse and intent, through moving beyond the racism, would mean not only moving beyond the facts of blackness, but also returning to a sort of marginality that had been deconstructed for a long time. The paradox is well underlined by Appiah when discussing on the dignity of a Black, which would require the self-recognition of that Black, in the register of allowing assumptions on a long-debated natural difference between races, which was dismissed on the same self-recognition and self-confidence need of the Self (individual, group, community) to impose its discourse on the Other (of the same dimension).

In this aporia of difference, the debate is about what should or should not be reflected, expressing one's tolerance that should be shown to differences suggested by racism and one's respect that ought not to be shown in reference to them (Gutman 1994, 21). Since, the main purpose of naming the race without a race, i.e. without its significance, would be in line with Charles Taylor's assertion: „Everyone should be recognized for his or her unique identity." (Taylor 1994, 38). In fact, not seeing differences would be in itself unfair for those who defended them and recognized them, the imposition being evident from the part of hegemonic or superior Others. This was also asserted considering the difference-blind society inhumane and highly discriminatory (Taylor 1994, 43). Showing respect to the differences means, on the contrary, putting much emphasis on them, something that would produce the same effect, recognition preceding new imposition.

While discussing the construction and recognition of identities, the tolerance and respect, but, most importantly, the context-sensitive ways a system of rights should be updated in order to allow non-discriminatory discourse for the definition of each and every subject or Self (Habermas 1994, 116), social studies might seem open to welcome a notion such as the fact of color, based on the discourse of *cosmopolis*'s colors encompassing the fact of differentiation.

The fact of differentiation includes, therefore: the problem of identification –recognition-imposition based on the summary discussion above; the subject - as an object of this identification; the process related to the identification-objectification; and the problem of authenticity. For Appiah, who opposes Taylor (who, after all, positioned himself or was positioned on the part of a communitarian view, although would have said that „ it is based on who I am that I develop my identity”), the creation of identity was a process in the process of socialization (Appiah 1994, 134), directed by concepts and practices of school, religion, state, society and mediated by the family.

This is being shared in development studies by the paradigm of different boundaries of clan, tribe, language, region, culture, civilization, empire, religion, state, nation, race, ethnicity, centrism (Pieterse 2001, 234), whose deconstruction, paradoxically, would be necessary in order to assert the cosmopolitanism itself. In order to correct this, Appiah comments the problem of authenticity, focused on the spatial aspect of the identification. Namely, in a more narrative line, since people are the creation of themselves, based on a decision they take in this direction, this decision is necessarily limited by the context, the options that they are given to decide, by culture or society (Appiah, 1994, p 155). Authenticity should reflect, in this discourse, not the real or virtual space of definition of the self, or the realization of the socialization process, but the neutral space of corrections and adjustments necessary while identification is in progress, including all struggles carried in this intent.

3. Conclusions and further discussions on the fact of color

Calling on Sartre’s „antiracist-racism” Appiah highlights the dangers of turning the power points and replace the race difference abolitionism with indifference about it, thus disrespecting the difference (Appiah 1994, 163).

From the perspective of development and images of power, differences were relative to the observer also, depending on the cultural background and intercultural communication with the culture whose difference was recognized (Pieterse 1992, 50-51). Because, apart from the space, the subject and the process, the difference in the object could become a difference in the subject. The consciousness of the subject on the extent and type of his cultural difference would be, therefore, the first necessary thing in order to define the respect to the difference, without seeing it as a racial one.

The *fact of color* would finally be the fact of knowing and constructing the difference meanwhile deconstructing the object of it. The *fact of color* would try to propose a paradigm shift on racism, discrimination, but also color-blindness based on the sort of essence-less recognized differentiations. It would be like a lion's construction of his difference from a rabbit, based on the courage that defines his character, meanwhile deconstructing courage in the context of the relationship between subjects (predator/courageous vs. victim/fearful), who were objectified for the sake of the comparison.

Looking at recent European or American no-global, anti-migratory movements, besides tendencies to block, reduce and control the migration (e.g. Hungarian Viktor Orban's politics, President Trump migration policies, Italian Lega Nord discourse, some of the Gillet Jaunes's arguments), the question to be answered is, aren't all people in some sort of a „fact" that characterize the fact of color?

Both oppositions that people of color face in the modernist discourse (positionality, power, political and social configurations), or in the postmodernist discourse (the discourse of difference, representation of the Other) in a critical perspective on multiculturality (Gordon 1995, 59) could be faced by those who were not considered of color, thanks to the position of their speaking or reading, even transmitting the knowledge on the Other.

Hence, the new subject of color is created in the aftermath of the Postcolonialist thinker's rise, in the light of Africanist/Orientalist self-justification discourse, despite the criticism on the replication of colonial-type mappings. Appiah's characterization of the Postcolonialists as „relatively small, Western-style, Western-trained group of writers and thinkers, who mediate the trade in cultural commodities of world capitalism at the periphery" (Appiah 1991, 348) is often and correctly cited in this regard. Therefore, this new subject of color should be as peripheral as the discourse it comes from. In this, since periphery usually justifies the existence of a center or a unique reference, despite the differences it sees, denies, or unifies, the universality could be newly emphasized.

Since Pieterse (Pieterse 1998, 2010), Raffer & Singer (Raffer & Singe 2001, 54) or Agugua (Akanle & Adesina 2018, 45) have linked the concept of center-periphery to the theory of unequal exchanges, a certain universal logic to defend the idea of cosmopolis would not be possible. Though, due to equal justifications that come from the same root, for example, the discrimination (which in a black/white register becomes positive/negative in reference to a territory), the center and periphery tend to coincide and deconstruct marginality.

Following the example of the lion and the rabbit, the fact of color is based on positionality and interconnection. In this process, the power games themselves justify the colorfulness of discourse, dialogues, politics, economy, or shortly, each domain of the social life. The very fact of seeing these games and participating in them stands for the process of authorizing the Self. Then, it is justified the demand if "Is not the de-authorizing of the self-locked into the privilege of cosmopolitanism?" (Mohanram & Rajan 1995, 113).

In reference to the power games, seen at the international level, not only between states but also between positioned knowledge, academies, corporations neo-colonizing regions, the hegemony was typically the expression of a claiming of purity. Taking inspiration from Jan Nederveen Pieterse, who asserted that this claim of purity was a claim to power that applied to all status boundaries, so not limiting the discourse to nation, ethnicity or race (Pieterse 2001, 228), means actually that universality is a pre-condition of the self-definition.

Being universal would mean being colorful in the sense that color-blindness would contrast the system of individual rights created in inter-subjectivity (Habermas 1994, 113). Seen on the spectrum of light, from the fact of blackness to the contextual fact of whiteness, the *fact of color* should be viewed and theorized, using these four concepts of space, subject, process and difference. These are also elements necessary to assert that colorful thinking is needed, in order to keep cosmopolitanism alive.

Color-blindness was not appreciated by the so-called people of color, as also professor Stephen Small highlighted in his discourse at the AfroEuropeans Conference in Lisbon, in 2019, meaning, therefore, that existence of facts is not negated, but rather underligned for the nostalgia of struggles for further recognition. These struggles needed to have, and still need to have a position on the stage of history's thinking, as emblematic for the decolonization of the minds (Wa Thiong'O 1981). Although the notion of color, in public debate, is still very delicate, the *fact of color* that includes it is necessary in order to assure the continuity of the Self, beyond time, space and dislocation, in accordance to readings of Mbembé on the discourse of Edward Willian Blyden (Mbembé 2017, 34).

Moreover, the *fact of color* would help deconstruct the imposition of Western values and the „founding narrative of the Western consciousness of Blackness" (Mbembé 2017, 28), criticizing the phenomenological perception of the Other based on the Self, who is at the center of meanings, although trying to narrow the possibilities of the Other to become central to our meanings, as in replication of a colonial gaze. Grounded on difference, the *fact of color* is the expression of a locus for the politics of humanity acclaimed by Achille Mbembé, as a "politics of the similar", based on the sharing of differences (Mbembé 2017, 178), as suggested by Appiah, as well. Exploring the notion of cosmopolitanism in comparison with that one of nationalism, moreover exposing the subject to frequent alternative from the meanings of individuality to that one of system (nation, group, culture), the arguments in this paper converge to the creation of an alternative to concepts of color, race, ethnicity, culture, unifying them under the umbrella of a *fact of color*, or later on, a *fact of subjectivity* and *a fact of differentiation*.

The argumentation follows a direction indicated by Appiah whose works on cosmopolitanism were fundamental for the understanding and acceptance of diversity, but not restricted to it. The point of departure of the arguments being the marginal character of the subject, the space, subject and the process, the most important conclusion from where the debate should go on is that, in the perspective of these reflections, cosmopolitanism represents the image in the mirror of different but not functionally differentiated nationalisms. On the other hand, the world would be described as a set of colors that exist and have to continue to exist in their positive capability to show differences and their functional necessary similarities.

Notes

1. I mean that we are already in the started third century after.
2. Using a general expression to reflect the language-oriented model of thinking of and questioning the reality, that inspired structuralism and post-structuralism.
3. The group of emerging economies, as defined by Jim O'Neill: Brasil, Russia, India, China, South-Africa.
4. For example, USA, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan.

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Book Review: Arvidsson, Stefan. 2019. *Religion and Politics under Capitalism. A Humanistic Approach to Terminology*

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For many decades, religion was widely considered as inevitably and drastically diminishing in influence across the various modern societies. Nonetheless, after a long period of being increasingly relegated to the background, religion – in one form or another – has made an important return in Western discourse. Thus, one is faced with the increasing popularity of alternative perspectives regarding the spiritual, from new religious movements and individual spirituality to personal growth, or even philosophical counselling, among others. The change which has occurred has had many interpretations and focus points, even as it remains to be seen if and to what extent this apparent re-enchantment will be sustainable in the 21st century. The book written by Stefan Arvidsson seeks to demonstrate the essential importance of the capitalist economy as the framework for understanding the relationship between religion and politics, all the while arguing in favour of a humanist perspective.

The first part is divided into three chapters, dealing with totalitarianism and political religion, mythic politics and the masses, as well as liberalism and capitalist religion. The first chapter takes into account the importance of the Political Religion School, including a number of authors linked to the study of 20th century totalitarianism. Arvidsson is right to draw the attention to the role of a hostile observer, correctly stating that while individual eye-witnesses could attribute religious features to totalitarian movements, this does not necessarily prove that they possessed a religious nature. The next chapter outlines his proposal for studying the features understood as “political religion” under a new guise, namely, that of “mythic politics”. Significantly, the author argues that liberalism, which originally had “a mythopoetic production as impressive as any of the other ideologies” has withered during the 20th century, contributing to the idea that liberalism is “a sober and rational, nonmythic political project” (Arvidsson 2019, 31). This is expanded upon in the following chapter, introducing two provocative and somewhat problematic terms, which are partially based in the argument that capitalist society is more influenced by intrastructural market method of regimentation rather than by superstructural ideologies. Arvidsson uses “ideology” ideationally, and in a non-pejorative sense, which is not related to “cognitive misjudgement”, “the superstructure of a class”, “a more or less unconscious mentality, hegemony or habitus”, but as “a set of formulated ideas”, in a manner typical to political science (Arvidsson, 34). The first concept is “capitalist religion”, or “the mythic politics of liberal capitalism […] a phenomenon that exists all around us” (Arvidsson, 45). This leads to the second concept, that of “capitalist totalitarianism”, which is considered in this manner because, according to the author, it operates on all level of society, with “neoliberal ideals about maximum profit for corporations, new public management and constant competition take control of education and welfare services”, depriving both democratic and theocratic alternatives of real power, and the people conceptualising themselves as commodities and brands, thus reinforcing the system (Arvidsson, 50).

The second part has chapters on the secular age and idealist scholarship, the concept of “everything religion” and the capitalist framework, ending with a humanistic view on religion. These chapters include analyses of the shortcomings of a number of secularisation theories, with Arvidsson focussing on Charles Taylor’s famous work, *A Secular Age* (2007). For instance, he criticizes Taylor’s “anti-modernism” and reliance on theology in his understanding of the history of religions, with Arvidsson suggesting instead that this history is to a far greater extent that of magic – in other words, practical-instrumental fertility magic, divination and healing rather than a dichotomy contrasting contemplative theology with secular instrumentality (Arvidsson, 73). The fifth chapter deals with an expansion of the author’s aim of placing the study of religion and politics within the conceptual framework of capitalism itself and its mode of production, while departing from the idealist perspectives still found in the study of religion. The "everything religion" concept – ranging from politics, to arts, to sports – is criticised for its unhistorical view that religion has remained essentially unchanged in its omnipresent nature, with the same criticism being reserved for perspectives insisting on the apparent novelty of secularity. The author therefore argues for a dialectical approach which recognises the existence of fundamental changes as well as of enduring nature of certain aspects, while avoiding being "limited by the horizons of the people analysed" (Arvidsson, 97) and surpassing cultural contingencies "*in the moment of questioning*" (Arvidsson, 98). The sixth chapter represents Arvidsson's argument for how the study of religion should be approached in the humanities, while stating his preference for a humanist outlook. Among other things, the chapter raises interesting points with regards to the old warning of avoiding building a paradise on earth and how anti-totalitarian and anti-utopian authors seem suspicious not towards paradise itself but towards the earthly paradise (Arvidsson, 107).

The short third part then deals with analytic and ideational definitions, as well as with modern religions and political ideologies. Thus, in the seventh chapter, Arvidsson attempts definitions of religion and politics, while once again considering the difference between religious politics and political religion. In doing so, he comes to the conclusion that only those politics which have been proven to be concretely and fundamentally based on religious ideas should be categorised as "religious politics", with ideology necessarily being theology in part (p. 129). The last chapter of the book seeks to portray religious modernism, religious traditionalism, and religious fundamentalism. This section briefly considers their stance on the modern, secular capitalist world and major modern political ideologies, while also including an analysis on Fascism and fundamentalism.

One of the most interesting cases in the book is the author's investigation of interpretations of Fascism. For instance, in concluding his analysis of the Political Religion School, Arvidsson states that "the myth-like structure of a history describing the struggle between totalitarian *mythos* and liberal-capitalist *logos* […] tends to direct scholars to different kinds of source material when analysing 'mythic' fascism (and other 'political religions') and when analysing 'reasonable', non-totalitarian ideologies", or even threatening to put shots from *Triumph des*

Willens side by side with texts by John Rawls (Arvidsson, 34). At the same time, as is reiterated in other sections of the book, Arvidsson makes the important point that most of the literature has failed to take into account that the liberal opposite of totalitarianism has its own mythic politics. Significantly, the author proposes a new means of comparison departing from comparing dramatic "totalitarian myth-and-ritual politics" with "educated liberal texts", whereby the comparison method "must begin by identifying where the ideological, mythic and post-political politics of a political culture is located; then it must describe them; and last, they must be compared with their isomorphic equivalents in other political movements" (Arvidsson, 33). Arvidsson believes that one should remain critical of schools of thought which portray Fascism as "a movement with an exceptional high density of mythic politics", arguing instead for the need to study its relationship to "conservative mythology and religious fundamentalism" – with emblems and symbols of the traditional authorities already highly visible in early 20th century public life (Arvidsson, 137). He continues by stating that Fascism was innovative in its means and methods rather than in ideological content and that it essentially used "modern means against modern ideals", including "hiking, uniforms, radio broadcasting, theatrical rallies, posters, charismatic leadership and rejection of traditional bourgeois lifestyles and sacred authorities" (Arvidsson, 139). The *new man* – which the author himself admits is not exclusive to Fascism and fundamentalism – is understood ideologically as a destroyer of decadence and as a true believer, with a certain *Männerbund* air found in both tendencies. Arvidsson is certainly correct to point out the way in which Fascism used modern means against what are considered typically modern ideals, yet herein lies an essential factor of a longer, complex discussion on totalist movements and their visions of an alternative modernity – when compared to that of many of their political rivals. This comes to the fore particularly when one is to involve what the author calls (modern) fundamentalism and linking this with "the fundamentalist-integralist criticism of secular societies (in some camps identified with 'Western decadence')" (Arvidsson, 139).

All in all, this work represents a useful take on some of the major religious-political trends, attempting to offer a useful historical framework in the context of a highly fractured contemporary scholarly effort which, in turn, sees various premises, terminologies, and disciplines grow to the detriment of a more cohesive, harmonious perspective. Along with its effort at reminding readers of the original mythopoetic capacity of liberalism – and discussing its subsequent transformation –, it is in the attempt to portray discussions and terminologies on religion and politics that the book has its greatest merit.

Reference

Arvidsson, Stefan. 2019. *Religion and Politics under Capitalism. A Humanistic Approach to Terminology.* UK: Routledge. 166 pages. ISBN: 978-0-429-05342-9